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CONFUSION OVER USE
I. INTRODUCTION
For several decades, the concept of consumer confusion has served as
the touchstone for trademark liability.' The nature and level of actionable
confusion, along with the forms of consumer understanding that are
properly protected against confusion, have been the principal focus of
debate regarding the appropriate compass of trademark law.2
During the last three years, however, a number of scholars have argued
that an unauthorized user of a mark is only liable, and should only be liable,
when it uses the plaintiff's mark "as a mark."" According to this argument,
sometimes called the trademark use theory, the nature of the defendant's
use serves as a threshold filter, requiring courts to engage in a preliminary
inquiry regarding the nature of that use, thereby downgrading any analysisS 4
of its effects on consumer understanding. Indeed, courts following this new
1. Not all forms of confusion are actionable under trademark law, and thus, a third party
may be permitted to engage in some uses of a mark notwithstanding the fact that such uses
cause confusion. See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111,
121-22 (2004).
2. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000) (rendering actionable confusion inter alia as to
affiliation, endorsement, sponsorship, or connection); Pub. L. No. 87-772, § 17, 76 Stat. 769,
773-74 (1962) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1114) (expanding actionable confusion by
deleting references to "origin" and "purchasers"). See generally Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana,
Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 775 (1992) (rejecting the doctrine of "secondary meaning in the making");
Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Comm'ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding initial
interest confusion actionable); A & H Sportswear, Inc. v. Victoria's Secret Stores, Inc., 237 F.3d
198 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that reverse confusion is actionable); Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio v.
Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235 (6th Cir. 1991) (finding post-sale confusion actionable); Truck Equip.
Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1217-18 (8th Cir. 1976) (protecting product
designs as source-identifiers). Even scholars who argue that trademark law historically sought to
vindicate producer interests recognize that, under that model, focusing on consumer confusion
served as a primary means of identifying those circumstances where producer interests were
being undermined. See Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1848 (2007). Contemporary trademark doctrines, such as dilution
protection, that dispense with a focus on confusion have proven controversial. See Federal
Trademark Dilution Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000); see also Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer
Protection Act of 1999, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2000).
3. See generally Margreth Barrett, Internet Trademark Suits and the Demise of "Trademark Use,"
39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 371 (2006); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademark and Consumer
Search Costs on the Internet, 41 HOuS. L. REV. 777 (2004); Uli Widmaier, Use, Liability, and the
Structure of Trademark Law, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 603 (2004). See also McKenna, supra note 2, at
1892 (noting the "traditional requirement that, in order to infringe, the defendant [must] use a
term as a source-designator (as a trademark)"). See also, generally, Eric Goldman, Deregulating
Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law, 54 EMORY LJ. 507 (2005).
4. The primary autonomous use-related filter is jurisdictional. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (a)
(requiring "use in commerce" as a prerequisite to one basis for an application for a federal
registration); In reTrade-Mark Cases, 100 US. 82, 99 (1879) (striking down a federal trademark
statute that was not restricted to uses in interstate commerce); see also infra text accompanying
notes 50-56 (discussing statutory provisions requiring "use in commerce" as basis for federal
court jurisdiction over infringement). Given the evolution in our understanding of the
Commerce Clause, this has proved to be a minimal filter. See Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v. Kremer,
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theory would not even reach the question of confusion absent the
,5defendant's use being a "trademark use." A defendant engaged in non-
trademark use would ipso facto be immune from liability.
6
Proponents of the trademark use theory claim that requiring trademark
use as a prerequisite to infringement has been an implicit (though largely
unarticulated) principle of trademark law since before consumer confusion
assumed its analytical dominance in the twentieth century.7 The principle,
they argue, finds expression (albeit not in haec verbis) in the Lanham Act or
has been an underlying principle of trademark law-consistent with
standard economic theories of trademark law-that recent developments
have brought to the surface. Supporters of this position have been spurred
to excavate the theory in hopes of furthering a number of contemporary
policy objectives, primarily with regard to online contextual advertising and
affiliation merchandising. The trademark use theory threatens, however, to
become even more pervasive-an all-purpose device by which to immunize a
diverse set of practices from even potential liability for trademark
infringement.8
Arguments invoking the theory have been made to courts and
legislatures, both in the United States l 'and elsewhere." The trademark use
403 F.3d 672, 677 (9th Cir. 2005) ("'Use in commerce' is simply a jurisdictional predicate.");
Dogan & Lemley, supra note 3, at 806 (describing "use in commerce" as a jurisdictional
requirement).
5. The nature of the defendant's use is relevant to the scope of trademark protection,
but the trademark use theory attaches deterministic significance to the nature of the use
independently of the context in which the use occurs and, thus, of the effects of that use. See
infra Part III (discussing fair use, nominative use, parody, and the multifactor likelihood of
confusion test).
6. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 3, at 809, 810 n.130 (listing scenarios that the
trademark use theory has immunized).
7. See Barrett, supra note 3, at 378; Dogan & Lemley, supra note 3, at 779; Widmaier, supra
note 3, at 708 (asserting that trademark use is a "foundational premise of trademark law").
8. See Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005: Hearing on H.R. 683 Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 1, 16
(2005) [hereinafter Dilution Hearing] (testimony of Anne Gundelfinger); id. at 18, 21 (testimony
of Mark A. Lemley); Dogan & Lemley, supra note 3, at 809, 810 n.130.
9. See Proposed Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005, H.R. 683, 109th Cong. § 2
(2005); Dilution Hearing, supra note 8, at 7, 24 (proposing a dilution cause of action that would
have required that the defendant engage in use of plaintiff's mark as a designation of source);
see also Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Dilution's (Still) Uncertain Future, 105 MICH. L.
REv. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 98, 100 (2006), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/firstimpressions/
voll05/dinwoodie.pdf (noting arguments that the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006
introduced a trademark use requirement in dilution actions).
10. See generally 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WArhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400 (2d Cir. 2005);
Interactive Prods. Corp. v. a2z Mobile Office Solutions, Inc., 326 F.3d 687 (6th Cit. 2003); Site
Pro-i, Inc. v. Better Metal, LLC, No. 06-CV-6508, 2007 WL 1385730, *4 (ILG) (RER) (E.D.N.Y.
May 9, 2007) ("[The] key question is whether the defendant placed plaintiff's trademark on any
goods, displays, containers, or advertisements, or used plaintiffs trademark in any way that
indicates source or origin."); Hamzik v. Zale Corp/Delaware, No. 3:06-cv-1300, 2007 WL
1600 [2007]
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doctrine would function to limit the reach of trademark law, and it would do
so in a large number of different contexts.'" Thus, for example, the theory of
trademark use would allow Google to sell Athlete's Foot, Inc. the right to
have the Athlete's Foot website appear prominently in the search results
generated when a user queries for NIKE, even if the presentation of results
' 3
induced consumer confusion. Likewise, it would permit Joe's Yankee HQ
1174863 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2007); J.G. Wentworth v. Settlement Funding LLC, No. 06-0597,
2007 WL 30115 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2007); Edina Realty, Inc. v. TheMLSonline.com, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1039 (D. Minn. 2006); Buying for the Home, LLC v. Humble Abode, LLC, 459 F. Supp.
2d 310 (D.N.J. 2006); Rescnecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 393 (N.D.N.Y. 2006);
800-JR Cigar, Inc. v. GoTo.com, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 2d 273 (D.N.J. 2006); Merck & Co., Inc. v.
Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 402, affd on reconsid., 431 F. Supp. 2d 425
(S.D.N.Y. 2006); Google, Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1385 (N.D. Cal. 2005); Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700 (E.D. Va.
2004); U-Haul Int'l, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 723, 729 (E.D. Va. 2003); Wells
Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 293 F. Stipp. 2d 734 (E.D. Mich. 2003); see also Int'l Profit
Assocs., Inc. v. Paisola, 461 F. Supp. 2d 672 (N.D. Il. 2006) (deciding a case with similar facts to
many of the preceding cases, but offering no discussion); Theodore Davis, Jr., United States
Annual Review: Introduction, 96 TRADEMARK REP. 1, 1 (2006) (noting "[t]he increasing
preoccupation of courts with the nature of trademark use"). Scholars arguing for the trademark
use requirement find support for it in opinions in other cases in which the issue was argued but
in which the court's opinion did not mention the trademark use theory by name. See, e.g.,
Barrett, supra note 3, at 385 n.39 (discussing Bosley Medical Inst. Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672 (9th
Cir. 2005)).
11. See, e.g., Verimark (Pty) Ltd. v. BMW (AG), [2007] SCA 53 (Republic of South Africa,
Court of Appeal, May 17, 2007); Case C48/05, Adam Opel v. Autec AG, (ECJ 2007) (EU), 2007
WL 187793; (TA) 506/06 Matim Li v. Crazy Line Ltd., O.M. [2006] (Dist. Ct. Tel Aviv.,July 31,
2006) (Israel); R. v. Johnstone, [2004] E.T.M.R. 2 (H.L.) (Eng.); Arsenal Football Club Plc v.
Reed, [2003] E.T.M.R. 73 (Ct. App.) (Eng.); Nation Fittings (M) Sdn Bhd v. Oystertec Plc,
[2005] SGHC 225 (H. Ct. Singapore 2005), available at http://www.asianlii.org/sg/
cases/SGHC/2005/225.html; Dyer v. Gallacher, [2006] ScotSC 6 (Glasgow Sheriff Ct.) (Scot.),
available at http://www.bailii.org/databases.html#scot. A few countries-but not the United
States-have an explicit statutory requirement of trademark use as an element of an
infringement action. For an example of such a statute, see Trademarks Act, 1995, § 120(b) (3)
(Austl.). Trademark statutes in other countries, such as the United Kingdom, once contained
such a requirement but have been revised to make the question less certain. See Trade Marks
Act 1938, ch. 22, § 4(1) (a) (repealed Oct. 31, 1994); see also infra text accompanying notes 217-
21 (discussing EU law).
12. See, e.g., Matim Li, (TA) 506/06 (sale of keyword advertising); 1-800 Contacts, 414 F.3d
at 400 (pop-up advertising); Rescuecom Corp., 456 F. Supp. 2d at 393 (sale of sponsored links);
Verimark, 2007 SCA 53 (use of mark in background of advertising); R. v. Johnstone, [2004]
E.T.M.R. 2 (H.L.) (Eng.) (counterfeiting claim with respect to recorded music); ArsenalFootball
Club, [2003] E.T.M.R. 2 (claim with respect to merchandising of sports apparel); Nation Fittings
(M) Sdn Bhd, [2005] SGHC 225 (product design trade dress claim); Dyer v. Gallacher, [2006]
ScotSC 6 (Glasgow Sheriff Ct.) (Scot.), available at http://www.bailii.org/databases.html#scot
(merchandising); Adam Opel, 2007 WL 187793 (merchandising of model cars).
13. See, e.g., Dogan & Lemley, supra note 3, at 781 (discussing contextual advertising); see
also 1-800 Contacts, 414 F.3d at 400 (dismissing a claim with respect to pop-up ads); Rescuecom
Corp., 456 F. Supp. 2d at 393. Although not all forms of confusion are actionable under the
Lanham Act, see KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impressions 1, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 121-22
(2004), trademark use theorists would offer blanket immunity against liability for any form of
confusion.
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Inc. to sell unauthorized BOSTON RED SOX merchandise, provided that
Red Sox fans purchase the merchandise to "show loyalty" to the team
without concern for the authorized or unauthorized nature of the
merchandise. 4 And, it would provide a defense for producers of knock-off
MOTOROLA RAZR phones if they were able to show that they copied the
distinctive RAZR design for its aesthetic appeal.15 Although courts remain
divided,' the majority of scholars have endorsed some variant of the
theory.
17
Stacey Dogan and Mark Lemley have offered the most cogent and
compelling articulation of the trademark use theory."' Like other scholars
who have recently invoked trademark use, their advocacy of the theory thus
far has been limited primarily to the context of use of trademarks on the
Internet. 9 However, they have sought to ground the theory in the historical
and theoretical foundations of trademark law and, illustratively, have
suggested its application in a far broader array of trademark settings, both
online and offline.20
In this Article, we take on the trademark use theory in its own right. We
reject the theory both descriptively and prescriptively. Contrary to emerging
indications in recent case law and scholarship, 2 1 we find no foundation for
the theory in current U.S. trademark law, and we suggest that its adoption
may have consequences unintended by its proponents. Trademark use
theory is advocated in order to enhance certainty and thus encourage
innovation, but trademark use theorists are pursuing a false and illusory
14. Cf Arsenal, [2003] E.T.M.R. at 73 (noting the lower court's suggestion that the use of
the trademarks on unauthorized merchandise merely to allow wearers to show "loyalty" to their
sports team might preclude a cause of action); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The
Merchandising Right: Fragile Theory or Fait Accompli ?, 54 EMORY L. J. 461, 464-65 (2005)
(supporting a limited version of the merchandising right).
15. Cf Nation Fittings, [2005] SGHC at 225.
16. Compare, e.g., 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 412 (2d Cir.
2005) (dismissing claim on trademark use grounds), with Google, Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper
Factory, Inc., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 1395 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (permitting a claim to proceed
to trial, but finding no likely confusion), andJ.G. Wentworth v. Settlement Funding LLC, No.
06-0597, 2007 WL 30115, at *4-6 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2007) (rejecting defendant's argument that
its purchase of a keyword involved no trademark use, but finding that no likelihood of
confusion existed as a matter of law). For a fuller list of cases raising this issue, see supra notes
10-12.
17. See supra note 3 (listing scholars).
18. See generally Dogan & Lemley, supra note 3; Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, A
Search Costs Theory of Trademark Defenses, in TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF
CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH (Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis eds., 2008) (forthcoming)
[hereinafter Dogan & Lemley, Defenses] (manuscript on file with the authors).
19. See e.g., Dogan & Lemley, supra note 3; see also Barrett, supra note 3.
20. See Dilution Hearing, supra note 8, at 18, 21 (testimony of Mark A. Lemley); Dogan &
Lemley, supra note 3, at 809-10; see also Barrett, supra note 3, at 452; Widmaier, supra note 3, at
708.
21. See generally supra notes 3 and 10.
1602 [2007]
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determinacy. Adoption of the trademark use theory will merely prevent
trademark law from policing new information markets. Limiting liability to
trademark use, as that term is understood by its proponents, 2 will thus result
in insufficient marketplace regulation.
The range of contexts (such as product design, music counterfeiting,
and brand merchandising) in which a trademark use argument has been
advanced of itself makes the theory one of the most important in
contemporary trademark law. And its assertion in the worldwide litigation
surrounding Google's advertising programs-from which the world's
leading search engine generates eighty-five percent of its revenues-gives
the theory an immediate and substantial commercial significance.2 3 With
some oversimplification, advertisers pay Google to have their webpages
appear on a list of sponsored links in response to a user query consisting of
the trademark of a rival producer, prompting trademark infringement suits
by the owners of the marks used in this fashion (against both the search
engine and the purchasers of the advertising).24
But the debate over trademark use implicates even more profound
questions that permeate (and, in some respects, transcend) trademark law.
For example, use-based doctrines are among the central elements in the
narrative of trademark law as an efficiency mechanism-a narrative
expounded by leading Chicago School scholars and embraced by the U.S.
25Supreme Court. Yet, technology is changing the ways that consumers
21,
search and shop. It is an open question whether the Chicago School
22. The term "trademark use," or "use as a mark," carries substantial ambiguity, which we
probe in Part 1II. For a representative definition proffered by one leading advocate of
trademark use, see Barrett, supra note 3, at 375 ("[Tlrademark use entails application of a mark
in a manner that invites consumers to associate the mark with goods or services that the user is
offering for sale or distribution and to rely on it for information about the source, sponsorship,
or affiliation of those goods or services.").
23. See Saul Hansell, Advertisers Trace Paths Users Leave on Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2006,
at C1 ("[A]dvertising on search engines is already a $14-billion-a-year business because the ads
can be so closely tied to what people are looking for."); see also Matthew G. Nelson, Google Posts
Q4 Profit, Plans to Expand Advertising Options, CLICKZ NEWS, Jan. 31, 2007, available at http://
www.clickz.com/showPage.html?page=3624825 (discussing Google revenues).
24. See Google, Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385,
1386-87 (N.D. Cal. 2005); Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 701-
02 (E.D. Va. 2004).
25. See generally Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163-64 (1995)
(describing the purposes of trademark law in terms of effects on search costs); Daniel M.
McClure, Trademarks and Competition: The Recent History, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring
1996, at 13, 29 [hereinafter McClure, Trademarks and Competition] (observing that "the Chicago
School approach has had an undeniable impact on trademark cases across the board"); Daniel
M. McClure, Trademarks and Unfair Competition: A Critical History of Legal Thought, 69 TRADEMARK
REP. 305 (1979) (discussing the development of trademark doctrine); see also Stephen L. Carter,
The Trouble with Trademark, 99 YALE L.J. 759, 759 (1990).
26. See The Ultimate Marketing Machine-Internet Advertising, THE ECONOMIST, Jul. 6, 2006, at
64, available at http://www.economist.com/business/displaystory.cpm?story-id=7138905.
1603
92 IOWA LA WREVIEW
analysis of search costs-persuasive in calibrating trademark law generally
and invoked by trademark use proponents in support of the theory-
adequately accounts for the dynamics of new information markets.
27
The broader jurisprudential dilemma of how law adapts to
technological change also animates the trademark use debate. In particular,
the debate implicates the wisdom of slavishly pursuing analogies between
the offline and online world and the pace at which law adjusts to new socio-
technological forces. Limiting effective Lanham Act regulation of new
market activities (as proponents of trademark use do by opting not to allow
trademark law to police certain online activities) may be a premature and
unrefined response to what, after the hubbub of today's technological
advance has subsided, may be a much more complex social phenomenon.28
Moreover, the trademark use debate serves as a vehicle to consider what
one of us has called the difference between proactive and reactive
trademark lawmaking. 29 Trademark law has become a leading instrument
for shaping the forces by which consumer understanding is developed. A
proactive view of trademark lawmaking embraces the proposition that
trademark law should be used to influence the norms that govern
consumers' shopping habits. In contrast, a reactive view relegates trademark
law to the role of discerning and protecting extant consumer
understanding. For example, a reactive scholar might focus on whether
substantial confusion exists as a result of the way a search engine sells
keywords and presents search results. Such an approach holds open the
prospect that search engines would be found liable for the sale of
trademarks as keywords, but they would avoid liability if likely confusion
31 32
were absent." Trademark use theorists largely reject a reactive approach.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 140-51 (discussing the increased search costs
associated with information overload and the incompleteness of the search costs rationale as an
account of trademark law).
28. Cf Suzanna Sherry, Haste Makes Waste: Congress and the Common Law in Cyberspace, 55
VAND. L. REv. 309, 311-12 (2002).
29. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Trademarks and Territory: Detaching Trademark Law from the
Nation-State, 41 HoUs. L. REv. 885, 889-90, 961-63 (2004) [hereinafter Dinwoodie, Trademarks
and Territory]; Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Seventh Annual Honorable Helen Wilson Nies Memorial
Lecture in Intellectual Property Law: The Trademark Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court, 8 MARQ.
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 187, 209 (2004) [hereinafter Dinwoodie, Rehnquist]; Graeme B.
Dinwoodie, Trademark Law and Social Norms, 3-5, 21, 26-30 (Sept. 5, 2006) [hereinafter
Dinwoodie, Social Norms] (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Iowa Law Review).
30. A purely reactive approach is arguably impossible. See Dinwoodie, Social Norms, supra
note 29, at 4. In essence, this debate revolves around the question of the extent to which and how
consciously trademark law wishes to construct consumer norms. See id.
31. Indeed, some courts have found for search engines on this basis. See Gov't Employees
Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 704 (E.D. Va. 2004); cf. J.G. Wentworth v.
Settlement Funding LLC, No. 06-0597, 2007 WL 30115, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2007) (granting
judgment to defendant that purchased the keyword corresponding to competitor plaintiff's.
mark on the ground that, as a matter of law, there was no likelihood of confusion "due to the
1604 [2007]
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For example, in the context of the Google litigation, they adopt an approach
that immunizes search engines from trademark liability regardless of the
form in which the search engines present search results and, thus, regardless
33
of short-term confusion. In contrast, we show that it is possible to adopt a
proactive stance without so abruptly discarding confusion-avoidance as a
relevant variable. We argue that an appropriate innovation policy should
offer immunity, if at all, only on conditions that further the goals of
trademark law.
Finally, the debate over trademark use roughly maps a jurisprudential
fault line between formalism and functionalism.35 Proponents of trademark
use rely on a single legal concept to do substantial work in limiting a
number of perceived excesses in current trademark law. But trademarks
increasingly serve a number of roles and, accordingly, our approach relies
on a number of legal devices, reflecting a variety of autonomous policy
justifications for limiting trademark rights. Moreover, our functional analysis
separate and distinct nature of the links created on any of the search results pages in
question").
32. See, e.g., Dogan & Lemley, supra note 3, at 836-37 ("The doctrine of trademark use...
holds sway against changing notions of consumer confusion; it is designed to be a bulwark
against unreasonable expansion of trademark law."). Of course, there is nothing inherently
commendable in resisting changing social practices when constructing a law designed to
protect real consumers, and thus, it is important for trademark scholars to explain why
trademark law should resist conforming to these inchoate social practices. See id. at 831-37
(discussing the norm creation aspect of rulings pertaining to search engines but offering little
normative justification for the norms the authors seek to create). But cf id. at 805 (discussing
practical realities for search engines).
33. See 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc. 414 F.3d 400, 409 (2d Cir. 2005).
Notwithstanding their disavowal of a reactive approach, some trademark use advocates have
explained the trademark use theory by arguing that consumers will not be confused by non-
trademark uses. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 3, at 812 (dismissing as "rather silly" a theory of
confusion based upon "whether the advertiser is likely to confuse consumers by placing its ad
next to the search results generated by the trademark as search term"); cf id. at 828 (supporting
trademark use theory in a search engine context by reference to a basic search costs justification
of trademark law). This defense of the theory highlights that doctrines might evince different
combinations of reactive and proactive lawmaking.
34. See infra Part IV.
35. And perhaps between ontological and teleological approaches to trademark law. See
generally Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Death of Ontology: A Teleological Approach to Trademark Law, 84
IOWA L. REv. 611 (1999). Although we characterize the approach of trademark use theorists as
formalistic, we do not mean to suggest that the notion of trademark use is a wholly arbitrary
limit on trademark rights. As we acknowledge below, on the whole, it is more likely that
trademark uses implicate the purposes of trademark law than uses that are otherwise than as a
mark. See infra text accompanying note 169. However, to the extent that the trademark use
theory imposes on courts a form of reasoning divorced from policy objectives, without any
concomitant reduction in administrative or error costs that might provide a utilitarian basis for
such a departure, see infra Part III.B, the approach can fairly be characterized as inappropriately
formalistic.
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of trademark law elevates contextual analysis over an unwise commitment to
the purported determinacy of abstract concepts such as trademark use.
3 6
Part II of this Article addresses the descriptive question underlying the
trademark use debate. To be sure, persons claiming the existence of trademark
rights generally must show that the mark in which rights are asserted is
being used as a mark, but infringement liability is not limited to equivalent
uses by a defendant. Indeed, an interpretation to the contrary would render
the statutory "fair use" defense superfluous. Also, despite the best efforts of
scholars to unearth supporting case law, U.S. courts have never consistently
articulated any such limitation on trademark suits." There are a number of
appropriate limitations on trademark rights that may have the effect of
permitting the types of third-party uses that proponents of trademark use
might wish to immunize from liability. But these are autonomous limits that
do not, other than by happenstance, map onto the trademark use theory.
We turn to prescriptive matters in Part III. Limiting liability to
trademark uses would be unwise for a number of reasons. First, while
trademark law cannot, and should not, dispel all possible confusion among
consumers, the adoption of the trademark use requirement would wholly
prevent trademark law from regulating important new areas of commercial
•• 38
activity, such as keyword advertising. We have little faith that unregulated
competition will optimally structure those new markets:39 And we question
36. We are not resolutely opposed to the use of general concepts to structure the contours
of trademark law. But we do resist such concepts when they result in an under-regulation of
commercial behavior that cannot be justified either by a reduction in administrative or error
costs or by a competing policy objective. For the reasons explained below, we think trademark
use is such a concept: insufficiently mapped to the purposes and contemporary roles of
trademark law and insufficiently certain to provide any offsetting reduction in costs.
37. See infra Part II (noting the recent vintage of case law).
38. In their response to this Article, Dogan and Lemley argue that sufficient regulation
can be effected through the doctrine of secondary or contributory liability. See Stacey L. Dogan
& Mark A. Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law Through Trademark Use, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1669, 1680
(2007). And to be sure, the doctrine of secondary liability enhances the enforcement options
for trademark owners where there is conduct with respect to the nature of the advertising that
implicates the purpose of trademark law. But the theories of indirect liability for intermediaries
premised upon the direct liability of advertisers for statements made in advertising copy only
regulates the sale of advertising space or the presentation of search results in an extremely attenuated
fashion, if at all. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Lessons from the Trademark Use Debate,
92 lOwA L. REV. 1703, 1715-16 (2007).
39. In contrast, the prospect of potential trademark liability has encouraged search engines
to develop policies designed to accommodate the concerns of trademark owners, competitors,
and the public. See Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 38, at 1716-17 (discussing search engine
trademark policies). But see Virginia Postrel, Consumer Vertigo, REASON, June 2005, at 49-54,
available at http://www.reason.com/news/show/36172.html (suggesting that marketplace
incentives will encourage market participants to help customers navigate choices). The ability
of consumers to make discerning choices as a result of information made available by online
intermediaries also depends upon there being some transparency regarding the nature of the
information presented to consumers. Absent that transparency, consumers will not have any
real informed choice, and search engines will be free to act self-interestedly in maximizing
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the implicit claim that more information is always better for consumers.
Sometimes more information is just more, and sometimes contextual
advertising impinges upon other policy concerns, such as privacy or
humanist concerns about a materialist, consumptive society.
Second, contrary to the claims of trademark use theorists,
implementation of the theory will not enhance certainty. According to
proponents of trademark use, a contextual infringement analysis that gives a
primary role to likely confusion imposes substantial litigation costs on
legitimate third-party users, enabling trademark owners to expand their
trademark rights through aggressive litigation strategies. In contrast,
trademark use is portrayed as a bright-line rule that will enhance certainty
and thus reduce barriers to innovation by minimizing litigation costs for
rival producers, third-party market participants, and even the public.40
The certainty argument is seductive. It resonates with critiques of other
areas of modern intellectual property law,41 and the quest for greater
certainty in trademark litigation captures the mood of recent SupremeCour " "42
Court jurisprudence. Moreover, the prospects for enhancing certainty
through trademark use might, at first blush, seem especially propitious.
Trademark use theorists might argue that courts applying the theory could
draw upon a long-established jurisprudence in which their forerunners
developed trademark use rules for establishing trademark rights. Indeed, in
the context of establishing rights, trademark use is often cast as the essential
theoretical rock on which U.S. trademark law is built, defining U.S. law
domestically and in the international arena.43 Furthermore, formalists might
be attracted to the symmetry between the concepts used to establish rights
and to prove infringement as a means of augmenting certainty.
However, a thorough historical analysis of the role of use in U.S. law
suggests that the sought-after certainty will be illusory. The development of
use-based concepts is a story of contextual and historical contingency,
yielding doctrines notable mostly for their malleability. Moreover, we are
suspicious of those seeking certainty through the symmetry in question (by
extracting use concepts from the rules for establishing rights and
incorporating them into the rules for infringement). The type of use that
might support the existence of consumer understanding (and thus the grant
advertising revenue and not optimizing information supply. See infra Part IV (discussing
conditions of possible safe harbor).
40. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 3, at 809-11.
41. See generally Lawrence Lessig, A Rotten Ruling, WIRED, Sept. 2005, at 94, available at
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/l13.09/posts.html?pg=7 (criticizing the Supreme Court's
ruling in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913 (2005)).
42. Dinwoodie, Rehnquist, supra note 29, at 207; see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara
Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 215 (2000).
43. We take issue with the essentialists more comprehensively elsewhere. See Graeme B.
Dinwoodie & Mark D. janis, Trademark Use (July 31, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the authors).
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of trademark rights) is not necessarily the same as that which might
undermine the integrity of consumer understanding (and thus justify a
finding of infringement). Even if transplanting trademark use from the
context of establishing rights to the context of proving infringement were
appropriate, trademark use theorists underestimate the difficulties entailed
in doing so. Indeed, the likely outcome of such a transplant is more
doctrine, not more certainty.
44
Third, the range of unauthorized third-party conduct that proponents
purport to bring under the umbrella of non-trademark use is both vast and
diverse. Much of this conduct should indeed be deemed noninfringing but
for many different reasons. To subsume all of this conduct under a single
(remarkably opaque) doctrine, such as trademark use, would mask the real
reasons for confining the scope of trademark rights in an expansionist era. It
would thus impoverish the transparent development of trademark policy,
deciding hard cases for unstated reasons.
Accordingly, we reject trademark use as the wonder theory of trademark
law. As we explain in Part IV, our approach calls for a contextual analysis
that retains for confusion its dominant role in determining infringement,
allied with the development of downstream common law principles (e.g., a
vibrant fair use doctrine) that reflect the multivalent nature of trademarks in
contemporary society.45 This approach, which contemplates potential liability
in a broad range of commercial settings, encourages private ordering to
avoid confusion and facilitates the development of targeted statutory
solutions to particular problems where appropnate. For example, one such
solution might involve immunizing search engines from trademark liability
for their marketing of advertising linked to the marks of rival producers
under certain conditions, thereby creating a safe harbor comparable to that
• 47
offered to internet service providers under copyright law.
44. And, as one of us has previously commented, "The last thing trademark law needs is
more doctrine." Dinwoodie, supra note 35, at 702.
45. See Rob Walker, The Brand Underground, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 30, 2006, at 29, 33
(noting the numerous social roles of branding for counter-cultural entrepreneurs).
46. SeeDinwoodie &Janis, supra note 38, at 1705, 1716.
47. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000) (creating safe harbors against copyright liability for Internet
service providers). In contrast, the unconditional immunity sought by trademark use theorists
would, we believe, result in insufficient policing of the online advertising environment. See infra
Part III.A.3. To be sure, if certain uses cannot be targeted as creating direct liability, plaintiffs
will surely argue claims of secondary infringement. As is evident from the reaction to the
Supreme Court decision in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913 (2005), the
scope of secondary liability for intellectual property infringement is a matter of some debate.
But secondary liability of search engines for direct trademark infringement by advertisers will,
under current standards, effect quite minimal regulation. See Dinwoodie &Janis, supra note 38,
at 1715-16.
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II. A CRITIQUE OF TRADEMARK USE ON DESCRIPTIVE GROUNDS
There is no statutory language expressly supporting the trademark use
theory.48 Even proponents of the theory concede as much. As a result, they
have been compelled to rummage through a vast assortment of trademark
doctrines in order to find a basis for their argument. Some scholars have
sought to tease transcendental significance from concepts developed
primarily in the context of establishing trademark rights rather than in
proving infringement. These include the historical affixation requirement.
Others have looked to the infringement provisions themselves, rendering a
gloss on phrases such as "use in commerce" and "use in connection with the
offering of goods and services" in order to support the theory.49 Finally,
some scholars have argued that the theory was embedded in the common
law and thus incorporated implicitly into the Lanham Act, and they support
the assertion with a revisionist reading of recent case law. None of these
strategies supplies a solid descriptive footing for the trademark use theory.
A. INTERPRETATION OF "USE IN COMMERCE"
Margreth Barrett has argued that the trademark use theory finds
statutory sanction in the Lanham Act definition of "use in commerce. " 5°
Section 45 provides that:
The term "use in commerce" means the bona fide use of a mark in
the ordinary course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a
right in a mark. For purposes of this chapter, a mark shall be
deemed to be in use in commerce -
(1) on goods when -
(A) it is placed in any manner on the goods or their
containers or the displays associated therewith or on the
tags or labels affixed thereto, or if the nature of the goods
makes such placement impracticable, then on documents
associated with the goods or their sale, and
(B) the goods are sold or transported in commerce, and
48. The statute does address "use otherwise than as a mark" or non-trademark use in the
fair use provision, suggesting that Congress knew how to enunciate the concept when it wished
to do so. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) ("'[W]here Congress includes
particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it
is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion
or exclusion.'" (internal citation omitted)).
49. The phrase "use in commerce" appears in the context both of establishing trademark
rights and in proving infringement. This may be explained to some extent by the partially
jurisdictional motivation of the phrase. See infra text accompanying notes 55-56.
50. See Barrett, supra note 3, at 382-83. Elsewhere, Barrett invokes the language of sections
32 and 43 of the Lanham Act. See id. at 378 n.18; see also infra text accompanying notes 76-77.
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(2) on services when it is used or displayed in the sale or
advertising of services and the services are rendered in
commerce, or the services are rendered in more than one
State or in the United States and a foreign country and the
person rendering the services is engaged in commerce in
51connection with the services.
•• 52
This definition is continually the focus of litigation. Yet, most of that
case law involves the establishment of trademark rights, whether to assert a
claim based upon an unregistered common law trademark53 or to obtain afederl " • 54
federal registration. For either purpose, a firm must use a mark (not
merely conceive of it) in order to assert rights, and that use generally must
be "in commerce."
Absent this last limitation, Congress might lack authority to enact
federal trademark legislation by virtue of the Supreme Court's opinion in
The Trade-Mark Cases.5  Strictly speaking, remedying that constitutional
defect simply required Congress to link federal trademark law to interstate
commerce. However, because the Court wrapped up its discussion of that
question with a comparison of the nature of copyrights and trademarks (one
resting on originality and the other on use), the composite phrase "use in
51. Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
52. Some courts have stressed that under this definition, for the purpose of acquisition of
rights, the meaning of "use in commerce" might be quite different for services than it is for
goods. See Int'l Bancorp, LLC v. Societe Des Bains de Mer et du Cercle des Etrangers a Monaco,
329 F.3d 359, 375 n.8 (4th Cir. 2003). This distinction has roots in the different means by which
it was thought that a purveyor of services could induce the association of its mark with its
services.
53. See Columbia Mill v. Alcorn, 150 U.S. 460, 463-64 (1893) (reviewing prior Supreme
Court cases and concluding that "the exclusive right to the use of the mark or device claimed as
a trade-mark is founded on priority of appropriation; that is to say, the claimant of the trade-
mark must have been the first to use or employ the same on like articles of production"); In re
Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879) ("The right to a particular mark grows out of its use
and not its mere adoption.").
54. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a) (requiring use in commerce). The Trademark Law Revision
Act of 1988 liberalized registration options by permitting intent-to-use applications. See id. §
1051 (b) (providing an alternative basis for registration based upon a bona fide intention to use
a trademark in commerce). However, in order to obtain a registration, an intent-to-use
applicant must file a statement verifying that the mark has been put into use in commerce
within a prescribed time. See id. § 1051(d). Thus, although Congress broke with longstanding
past practice on use when it enacted the intent-to-use provisions, it nonetheless emphasized the
"central role that use continues to play in U.S. trademark law." S. REP. No. 100-515, at 24
(1988). The principal exceptions largely involve the registration of foreign marks. See 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1126(e), 1141(f).
55. See In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94-95. Congress took up the hint that the
Supreme Court offered in its 1879 opinion as to how constitutionally to enact federal trademark
law. Thus, the use in commerce requirement in the Lanham Act is, to some extent,
jurisdictional. See supra note 4. But the Commerce Clause was less generously interpreted in
1879, and the constitutional constraints on federal trademark legislation are now less
demanding.
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commerce" is often used to confer constitutional legitimacy. Certainly, this is
what Congress did in the Lanham Act. Thus, the phrase appears not only in
the provision authorizing federal registration, but also in the infringement
provisions creating causes of action in the federal courts with respect to both
56
registered and unregistered marks.
Barrett draws a greater significance from the presence of the phrase in
both the registration and infringement provisions. 7 She argues that there is
nothing in the statutory language to suggest that the section 45 definition
was not intended to be read identically in both contexts. Thus, she argues
that the definition was "intended to apply ... whether it be in connection
with the acquisition of trademark rights or in defining when infringement
has occurred. 5 8 However, the infringement provision in section 32 explicitly
contemplates the possibility that use of a mark in connection with the
advertising of goods might give rise to liability, notwithstanding that the
section 45 definition of "use in commerce" provides that advertising of
goods is insufficient use to acquire trademark rights. 59 Thus, as Barrett
concedes, slight differences between the language in the infringement
provision in section 32 and in the definition of "use in commerce" open the
possibility that "the literal language of the section 45 'use in commerce'
definition is limited to defining the acts necessary to gain ownership and
registration of a mark."6t Indeed, to the extent that the 1988 Trademark Law
Revision Act-which amended the definition of "use in commerce"-is of
guidance,6' its legislative history favors treating the "use in commerce"
56. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a).
57. Trademark use advocates commonly cite 1-800 Contacts, Inc., v. WhenU com, Inc., 414
F.3d 400 (2d Cir. 2005), and DaimlerChrysler v. Bloom, 315 F.3d 932, 936 (8th Cir. 2003), for the
proposition that a trademark use requirement can be found in the "use in commerce"
language. See Barrett, supra note 3, at 374 n.7. But some of the other cases that trademark use
theorists cite as exemplars of the theory have rejected the "tse in commerce" language as
providing a statutory foundation. See Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 677 (9th
Cir. 2005) (rejecting the argument that "use in commerce" requires trademark use and relying
on the "in connection with goods and services" language to impose a requirement of
commercial use in infringement actions); see also Dogan & Lemley, supra note 3, at 806
(describing "use in commerce" as ajturisdictional requirement).
58. Barrett, supra note 3, at 383.
59. See supra text accompanying note 51 (quoting section 45). Moreover, as noted above,
the definition of "use in commerce" differs as between goods and services. See supra note 52.
But, given the growing assimilation of service marks and trademarks and the ability of similar
unauthorized uses of trademarks and service marks to interfere with consumer tmderstanding,
it would be surprising to find a rule that excluded from potential liability a different range of
conduct by third parties dealing with service marks rather than trademarks. Should the sale of
the keyword DELTA (a service mark for airlines) to United Airlines be treated differently from
the sale of the same keyword to a faticet producer that competes with DELTA faucets (a
trademark)? Yet, the assimilation of the establishment and infringement definitions might
produce this result.
60. Barrett, supra note 3, at 385.
61. See Qualitex Co. v.Jacobson Prods. Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 163-64 (1995).
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language as relevant only to registration. The relevant Senate Report
explained that "the revised definition is intended to apply to all aspects of
the trademark registration process .... Clearly, however, use of any type will
• ,,62
continue to be considered in an infringement action. Moreover, although
she acknowledges the jurisdictional function of the phrase, Barrett does not
account for that function in seeking an alternative explanation of its
presence in both provisions.
The textual discrepancies and the fuller jurisdictional explanation call
out for additional interpretive methodologies beyond declaratory
textualism. In particular, the different purposes that the "use in commerce"
requirement serves in the context of establishing rights and proving
infringement cut against an identical meaning. The requirement (and more
particularly, the "use" part of the phrase, as "commerce" is separately
defined) serves distinct purposes germane to the establishment of trademark
rights. 6 Absent consumers coming to associate a mark with a particular
source, there would be no reason to confer trademark rights on a particular
trader. Only when consumers come to associate goods with a particular
producer will they potentially be confused when the same or a similar mark
62. See S. REP. No. 100-515, at 44-45 (1988). The full passage reads:
The committee intends that the revised definition of "use in commerce" be
interpreted to mean commercial use which is typical in a particular industry.
Additionally, the definition should be interpreted with flexibility so as to
encompass various genuine, but less traditional, trademark uses, such as those
made in test markets, infrequent sales of large or expensive items, or ongoing
shipments of a new drug to clinical investigators by a company awaiting FDA
approval, and to preserve ownership rights in a mark if, absent an intent to
abandon, use of a mark is interrupted due to special circumstances. Finally, the
revised definition is intended to apply to all aspects of the trademark registration
process, from applications to register, whether they are based on use or intent-to-
use, and statements of use filed under Section 13 of the Act, to affidavits of use
filed under Section 8, renewals and issues of abandonment. Clearly, however, use
of any type will continue to be considered in an infringement action.
Id. We are indebted toJessica Litman for unearthing this item of evidence.
63. See also infta text accompanying notes 129-33 (discussing how the nature of use
relevant to establishing rights may be different from the nature of use relevant to
infringement). We focus here on the role of the use requirement in identifying when
trademark law needs to intervene in the free market through its relevance to the existence of
consumer association. However, the use requirement in the establishment context serves
additional purposes, such as a public notice function. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 18 cmt a. (1995) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]; see also Zazu Designs v. L'Oreal,
S.A., 979 F.2d 499, 503 (7th Cir. 1992). See generally Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D.Janis, Use,
Intent to Use, and Registration in the United States, in TRADEMARK USE 313, 315 (Philips & Simon
eds., 2005).
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is used by another trader."' But source-identification cannot occur absent
65
use.
Once consumer understanding, and hence a trademark right, is
established, the primary goal of trademark law is to protect the integrity of
that understanding by minimizing consumer confusion. Although consumer
understanding will likely only develop when a sign is used "as a mark," a
range of uses by a third party may interfere with that understanding.6 Thus,
a teleological analysis of trademark law would suggest that the concept of
use sufficient to establish rights might differ radically from the type of use by
a defendant that might give rise to infringement.
Given the weakness of relying on the definition of "use in commerce,""
it is not surprising that scholars seek to bolster their analysis by invoking
additional language in the infringement provisions. In particular, Barrett
suggests that language in the infringement provisions requiring that the
defendant's use be "on or in connection with any goods or services,"
perhaps taken together with the "use in commerce" language and perhaps
of itself, invokes the affixation requirement. 68
The affixation requirement, like the "use in commerce" language, has
historically been of greater import in the context of establishing rights. As
the Restatement explains, "[T] he law of trademarks originally recognized as
'use' only the direct physical affixation of the designation to the goods
marketed by the person claiming trademark rights. A designation that was not
physically affixed to the goods could not be protected."69 The key to this limiting
feature was the assumption that consumer association-the prerequisite to
the existence of trademark protection--could only develop when goods
were marked in this fashion. Infringement analysis inevitably is concerned
with a different question; namely, whether existing consumer understanding
64. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 63, § 18 cmt. a. ("Until a designation has been actually
used as a symbol of identification, its use by others creates no risk of confusion.").
65. See generally Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 43. When a plaintiff relies on the well-
known mark doctrine, see infra note 197, the claim of source-identification will rest on the
mark's reputation in the United States rather than its formal use here. But that reputation will,
in turn, depend upon use of the mark in some other country. See generally Dinwoodie,
Trademarks and Territory, supra note 29.
66. See infra text accompanying notes 125-39.
67. See I J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW § 23.11.1
(2006) ("This is not a reasonable reading of the statute ... it was clearly drafted to define the
types of 'uses' that are needed to qualify a mark for federal registration .. .not to infringe
them.").
68. It is not clear whether Barrett finds the affixation requirement in the infringement
provisions regardless of how one interprets "use in commerce" or whether her suggestion that
the affixation requirement is incorporated into the infringement inquiry also requires
reference to the "use in commerce" language. Either way, we are unpersuaded. But see id.
(disagreeing with Barrett's conclusion but agreeing with the connection between the "use in
commerce" definition and affixation).
69. RESTATEMENT, supra note 63, at § 18 cmt. d (emphasis added).
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is being tainted. A purposive analysis of the affixation requirement reveals,
once again, that one should not be surprised that nominally similar
language may have different meanings in the establishment and
infringement contexts, respectively.
Indeed, as Barrett acknowledges, the affixation requirement has been
substantially liberalized (even in the establishment context) to reflect a
modern economy in which marks are associated with a single producer in
ways that do not involve the physical branding of signs on products. 7
Affixation is a relic of the industrial era when consumers physically
interacted with trademarks in different ways. It is a surprising doctrine on
which to rest a theory for the twenty-first century.
7
'
Moreover, even assuming that the affixation requirement is intended to
operate as a constraint both on the establishment of rights and the scope of
infringing acts, the fact that a term is affixed to a product does not in any
way guarantee that the term is used as a mark.72 It is not uncommon for
70. See id. (recounting the historical reason for the affixation requirement, namely, that
"trademarks developed from medieval production marks that were affixed to goods
manufactured by the local guilds"). As the Restatement comments:
[C]hanges in commercial practices eventually made the requirement of physical
affixation impractical. . . . Modern marketing techniques also rendered the
affixation requirement obsolete with respect to trademarks for goods. Use of a
designation in the various advertising media can now establish the designation's
significance as an identifying symbol as surely as its appearance on packaging or
labels.
Id.
71. The liberalization is not all that recent. Moreover, as Barrett concedes, any strict
statutory requirement that defendant affix its mark in a particular fashion in order to be liable
for infringement of a registered trademark did not preclude the maintenance of an unfair
competition action, even where the plaintiff could not show that the defendant had affixed the
mark to any goods. See Barrett, supra note 3, at 387. As the U.S. Supreme Court recognized in
1916, the law of unfair competition was broader than trademark law. See Hanover Star Milling
Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 413 (1916). Of course, the two bodies of law converged over the
course of the twentieth century. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 776
(1992) (Stevens, J., concurring). Barrett cites this development to suggest that the unfair
competition action contracted to meet the rigorous formalities of an action for infringement of
technical trademarks. See Barrett, supra note 3, at 381 n.29. In fact, trademark law expanded
liberally to conform with the more generous contours of unfair competition principles. See
Qualitex Co. v.Jacobson Prods., 514 U.S. 159, 170 (1995).
72. Although the statutory formulations differ slightly, the current infringement language
upon which scholars invoking the affixation requirement rely essentially uses the terms "on or
in connection with goods." See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (a) (2000). Section 32(1) (a) imposes liability
on a party who, without the registrant's consent, shall
use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a
registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or
advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is
likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.
See id.; id. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (unauthorized use in commerce of another's unregistered mark "in
connection with any goods or services" gives rise to liability for unfair competition or so-called
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traders to be denied trademark protection for marks that they have placed
on their goods, satisfying the affixation requirement, but which are deemed
"non-trademark uses" because they are unlikely to create consumer association
as a result of the nature of the use.73 For example, one court recently denied
trademark rights to slogans that the plaintiff has used on its line of t-shirts,
noting that "[t]-shirts are a particularly ineffective medium through which to
establish an inherently distinctive mark. In our culture, t-shirts often serve as
personal billboards, carrying phrases that convey meanings that can range
from the entirely personal to political to humorous., 74 Affixation does not
map to the definition of use as a mark that proponents advance7 5
B. INTERPRETATION OF THE "IN CONNECTION WITH" CLA USE
Some scholars and courts, endorsing the trademark use theory, have
read the language of the infringement provisions requiring that the
defendant's use be "in connection with the sale ... of goods or services" as
76limiting infringement to trademark uses. This argument echoes that
discussed above, except avoids the problematic rhetoric of affixation. But
the same substantive flaws remain. There is no natural congruence between
trademark use and use in connection with goods and services. All "uses as a
mark" will indeed be uses in connection with the sale of goods or services.
But the contrary does not hold true: not all uses in "connection with goods
or services" must necessarily be uses as a mark. For example, as discussed
above in connection with the affixation requirement, a mark can be
unregistered or common law trademark infringement under Lanham Act section 43(a) in
specified circumstances). As noted above, the "use in commerce" definition refers to a mark
"placed in any manner on the goods or their containers or the displays associated therewith,"
and has even more liberal rules regarding services. See supra text accompanying notes 50-51.
73. The focus in contemporary trademark law is consumer association rather than formal
notions such as affixation. Cf Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102
Stat. 3935 (1988). The shift toward consumer association underlies the liberalization of the
affixation requirement. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 63, at § 18 cmt. d. Focusing on consumer
association, rather than formal acts of affixation, ensures that rights accrue only when the
source-identification purposes of trademark law are implicated. Id.
74. Juicy Couture, Inc. v. L'Oreal USA, Inc., No. 04 Civ. 7203, 2006 WL 1012939, at *18
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2006); see also In re Aerospace Optics, Inc., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1861, 1864
(T.T.A.B. 2006) (using the mark as a noun in sentence did not establish trademark rights even
where it was affixed to packaging of goods).
75. See Barrett, supra note 3, at 375 ("[T]rademark use entails the application of a mark in
a manner that invites consumers to associate the mark with goods or services that the user is
offering for sale or distribution and to rely on it for information about the source, sponsorship,
or affiliation of those goods or services.").
76. See id. at 385. Dogan and Lemley also invoke this argument, possibly in combination
with some reliance on the "use in commerce" language. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 3, at
798 (grounding trademark use theory in requirements that defendant's use be "in commerce"
and "on or in connection with any goods or services"). But in other parts of their article, Dogan
and Lemley suggest that they regard the "use in commerce" language as jurisdictional and
distinct from the trademark use theory. Id. at 806.
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imprinted on the front of a t-shirt and, thus, be used in connection with
goods, notwithstanding that trademark use theorists would deny that such
use was necessarily use as a mark." The "in connection with" language is
broader.
Given this lack of congruence, it is incumbent upon proponents of
trademark use to demonstrate some basis for an interpretation that reads
the broad concept of "connection" as restricted to the much narrower
universe of "uses as a mark." Neither the statute nor the legislative history
provides any basis. Indeed, if Congress wished to restrict the infringement
provisions in the way that trademark use theorists claim, it could surely have
tracked the language found in section 33(b)(4) and excluded from
infringement "uses otherwise than as a mark." But Congress did not do so,
leaving trademark use theorists to look beyond the statute.
C. COMMON LAw INCORPORATION
The descriptive argument that we believe warrants closest consideration
is that trademark use has long been an essential (though unarticulated)
principle of the common law that was incorporated (though implicitly) into
the Lanham Act in 1946. Such an argument seems to underlie the work of
several trademark use scholars, most notably Dogan and Lemley.78
In its general form, the argument of common law incorporation is
plausible. Early federal trademark registration statutes were understood as
schemes to acknowledge and confirm the existence of common law rights,
and the Lanham Act retained that general approach.79 Moreover, U.S.
trademark law has long recognized extra-statutory defenses to statutory
causes of action. 0
77. Similarly, although the use of a mark on replacement parts probably meets an
affixation requirement, some scholars would debate whether use on replacement parts would
constitute "trademark use." Cf Barrett, supra note 3, at 386 n.46.
78. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 3, at 798 (noting courts' "historical" insistence on
trademark use by defendant); id. at 805 (commenting on the "disturbing trend away from the
statutory requirement of trademark use, at least as traditionally interpreted by the courts").
79. See Robert C. Denicola, Some Thoughts on the Dynamics of Federal Trademark Legislation
and the Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1996, at 75, 79-80
("Putting aside statutory innovations directly linked to the public notice provided by the Act's
registration system, the Lanham Act codifie[d] the basic common law principles governing
both the subject matter and scope of protection."). The Lanham Act did depart from common
law in some respects. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Story of Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co.:
Breakfast with Brandeis, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 220, 240-41 (Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss & Jane C. Ginsburg eds., 2006). Since then, the Act has grown further beyond
common law principles. See Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat.
3935 (1988).
80. For example, trademark law has long had the need for a vibrant functionality doctrine,
even though that doctrine was entirely grounded in common law until 1999. See Dinwoodie,
supra note 35, at 684-728.
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To sustain the argument of common law incorporation, however, one
would need to show both the prior existence of the trademark use theory in
common law and no supervening legislative act that would countermand the
purported incorporation. Even if we were persuaded by arguments on the
prior existence of the theory,8' arguments on contrary legislative intention
are damning. Provisions of the Lanham Act are at odds with a theory of
trademark use, thus negating any such common-law-incorporation theories.
In particular, the theory cannot be squared with the language of section
33(b) (4) of the Lanham Act, which provides that it shall be a defense to an
action for infringement of any mark
that the use of the name, term, or device charged to be an
infringement is a use, otherwise than as a mark, of the party's
individual name in his own business, or of the individual name of
anyone in privity with such party, or of a term or device which is
descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe the
goods or services of such party, or their geographic origin.
82
If "use as a mark" were a threshold condition of trademark
infringement, all uses otherwise than as a mark, whether in good faith and
whether falling within the uses delineated by section 33(b)(4), would be
outside the scope of trademark rights. The plaintiff would be unable to
establish a prima facie case of infringement, rendering section 33(b) (4)
superfluous. Ordinary canons of statutory construction counsel against such
a reading. 83 Trademark use is not a plausible extra-statutory limitation; it is
an unjustifiable contra-statutory limitation, dispensing with the good faith
prerequisite to the fair use defense.
The U.S. Supreme Court's KP Permanent decision affirmed the
importance of giving meaning to section 33(b) (4). The plaintiffs in that case
had argued that a defendant asserting fair use had to show a lack of any
likely confusion.84 As the Supreme Court pointed out, such an interpretation
of the statute would render the fair use defense toothless because absent
such likely confusion, the plaintiff would not even have made out its prima
facie case. The Supreme Court appropriately identified the fair use defense
81. And we are not. See infra Part I.D.
82. Lanham Act § 33(b)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (4) (2000). Although the defenses listed
in section 33(b) are literally available in actions brought for infringement of registered marks
that have become incontestable, section 33(a) makes clear that they apply in all cases of alleged
trademark infringement. See id. § 1115(a). The availability of common law and statutory
defenses, respectively, might be different where a plaintiff owns an incontestable registration.
See Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp., 110 F.3d 234, 237 (4th Cir. 1997). We discuss this
complexity more fully in Dinwoodie &Janis, supra note 38, at 1708-10.
83. See Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004) (noting the interpretive rule against
legislative superfluity).
84. See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 119
(2004).
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as an important barrier to the overprotection of trademarks. 5 Yet,
proponents of the trademark use theory, like the unsuccessful plaintiffs in
KP Permanent, advocate an approach that would make the fair use defense
redundant.
D. CASE LAWREVSIONISM
Moreover, assertions that the common law long contained a well-
established trademark use requirement are unpersuasive and revisionist.
Most scholars agree that trademark law allows unauthorized third-party use
of marks in a wide range of commonplace factual scenarios. But trademark
use proponents now claim that these third-party freedoms have in fact been
86
secured by the theory of trademark use. Some also argue that the theory
explains a number of contested cases where courts have permitted one party
to make unauthorized use of another's mark.17 For example, proponents
85. We believe that more refined limits on the scope of trademark protection will be
realized, inter alia, by an animated development by courts of the fair use defense, guided not
simply by the abstract concept of "use otherwise than as a mark," but also by a contextual
analysis of good faith. See infra text accompanying notes 138-39.
86. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 3, at 805-11. Thus, Dogan and Lemley argue:
[Because of the trademark use theory,] newspapers are not liable for using a
trademarked term in a headline, even if the use is confusing or misleading. Writers
of movies and books are not liable for using trademarked goods in their stories.
Makers of telephone directories are not liable for putting all the ads for taxi
services together on the same page. In-house marketing surveyors are not liable for
asking people what they think of a competitor's brand-name product. Magazines
are not liable for selling advertisements that relate to the content of their special
issues, even when that content involves trademark owners. Gas stations and
restaurants are not liable for locating across the street from an established
competitor, trading on the attraction the established company has created or
benefiting from the size of the sign the established company has put up.
Individuals are not liable for use of a trademark in conversation, even in an
inaccurate or misleading way (referring to a Puffs brand facial tissue as a
"Kleenex," or a competing cola as a "Coke," for example). Generic drug
manufacturers are not liable for placing their drugs near their brand-name
equivalents on drug store shelves, and the stores are not liable for accepting the
placement.
Id. at 809-10. We do not disagree with any of the outcomes suggested here, but we think there
is little support for the assertion that the cause of immunity in any of these cases is a trademark
use requirement.
87. See, e.g., Dilution Hearing, supra note 8, at 16 (testimony of Anne Gundelfinger)
(suggesting that the trademark use requirement would immunize nominative and descriptive
uses of marks, such as uses in comparative advertising and in newspaper stories, as well as
parodies and satires) (citing, inter alia, Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc. 28 F. Supp. 2d 1120
(C.D. Cal. 1998), aft'd, 296 F.3d 894, 905 (9th Cir. 1992) and New Kids on the Block v. News
Am. Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992)); Dilution Hearing, supra note 8, at 18, 21
(testimony of Mark A. Lemley) (claiming trademark use as the basis for the ability to use a mark
in comparative advertising, to poke fun, to criticize, and to write newspaper stories); Dogan &
Lemley, supra note 3, at 809, 810 n.130. Interestingly, in countries (such as Australia) that have
an express trademark use requirement, the legality of comparative advertising flows not from
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claim that trademark use is the basis for (or, the rationale underlying, or the
sub rosa motivating principle for) decisions permitting use of another's mark
in, among other things, "product comparisons, consumer product
evaluations, []news reporting," and parody.88 According to this argument,
because of the trademark use doctrine, many or all of these uses are
immunized from liability.
Reading the cases in this fashion requires advocates of trademark use to
indulge in substantial revisionism. There are, of course, scores of trademark
cases in which courts permit one party to use another's mark.89 But virtually
none of these cases rests explicitly on a trademark use rationale. 90 Almost
without exception, the cases invoke no threshold trademark use
requirement, nor do they employ the methodology of trademark use under
some other rubric. Instead, these are cases in which there is no likelihood of
confusion in the first place or in which the balance of interests favors the
defendant (usually because the risk of confusion is low compared to the
adverse implications for other interests). 9
For example, trademark use theorists have placed a revisionist spin on a
grouping of trademark cases involving speech interests. In Rogers v.
Grimaldi,92 the Second Circuit considered whether defendant's movie title
("Fred and Ginger") implicated Ginger Rogers's trademark rights. The
district court had permitted the use under a rule that would, according to
the Second Circuit, have created "a nearly absolute privilege for movie titles,
insulating them from Lanham Act claims as long as the film itself is an
artistic work, and the title is relevant to the film's content."90 Rejecting that
rule, the Second Circuit opted in favor of a balancing analysis weighing
"public interest in avoiding consumer confusion" against "the public interest
the trademark use requirement but from an express defense. See Trademarks Act, 1995, §
122(l)(d) (Austi.).
88. See, e.g., Barrett, supra note 3, at 379 n.20. Barrett argues that as a result of the
trademark use theory, a court could not, for example,
deem an unauthorized use of the plaintiffs mark to be an infringing use if it
clearly serves only to identify or parody the plaintiff, to express political views, to
strictly describe aspects of the defendant's product or service, or, in the case of
domain names, to indicate an address on the Internet.
Id. at 386.
89. See GRAEME B. DINWOODIE & MARK D.JANIs, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION:
LAW AND POLICY 695-758 (2004) (collecting cases and materials on "Permissible Uses of
Another's Trademarks").
90. The express invocation of trademark use language by courts is a much more recent
phenomenon than trademark use advocates generally admit.
91. Indeed, these cases show quite persuasively that a respectable balance of trademark
rights is possible without a threshold trademark use requirement.
92. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989).
93. Id. at 997.
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in free expression. Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit followed suit, adopting
the Rogers balancing test in two cases in which defendants had used Mattel's
BARBIE mark in allegedly parodic artistic works.9 5 Nowhere do any of these
opinions invoke the use-as-a-mark rubric, and the contextualist methodology
that they do adopt is the very antithesis of the formalistic use requirement
advocated by trademark use proponents. 96 Yet, trademark use theorists
routinely invoke the BARBIE cases as exemplars of their methodology.
97
Fair use cases-again a label of rather casual usage applied by scholars
to a number of disparate decisions-exhibit the same pattern. In New Kids on
the Block v. News American Publishing Inc.,98 another case routinely invoked by
trademark use theorists, the defendant had run a newspaper poll about the
plaintiff pop band, using the band's name. Judge Kozinski's opinion
summarized trademark fair use cases as "best understood as involving a non-
trademark use of a mark,"99 a passage that, when taken out of context, reads
like a prelude to the adoption of a threshold trademark use requirement.
94. Id. at 999. The court went on to specify that:
In the context of allegedly misleading titles using a celebrity's name, that balance
will normally not support application of the Act unless the title has no artistic
relevance to the underlying work whatsoever, or, if it has some artistic relevance,
unless the title explicitly misleads as to the source or the content of the work.
Id. Under a threshold trademark use requirement, one might imagine a case such as Rogers
being resolved using a different methodology, according to a bright-line characterization of the
defendant's use rather than a balancing of competing interests. And, to be sure, in those
countries where trademark use is required, such uses have been found to be outside the scope
of trademark protection. See, e.g., Christodoulou v. Disney Enters., Inc., [2005] FCA 1401
(Austl.) (holding that the use of the term HUNCHBACK OF NOTRE DAME in the title of the
defendant's movie did not amount to trademark use of the plaintiff's trademark in that term).
However, as we discuss below, the concept of trademark use that applies in those countries
looks quite unlike the threshold gatekeeping concept that U.S. trademark use theorists
propose. Experience in those countries suggests that the concept of trademark use inevitably
devolves into analysis of a number of contextual factors. See id.; see also Shell Co. (Austl.) Ltd. v.
Esso Standard Oil (Austl.) Ltd., (1963) 109 CLR 407, 425 (1963) (FCA) (setting out factors);
infra text accompanying notes 218-20 (discussing Adam Ope/). Indeed, the factors that have
been developed in those countries come to look very much like an assessment of fair use, which
is where we think the heart of the analysis should be in any event.
95. See Mattel, Inc., v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 807 (9th Cir. 2003)
(permitting the use of BARBIE in the titles of photographs that displayed BARBIE dolls in
"various absurd and often sexualized positions" where the balancing analysis showed that "the
public interest in free and artistic expression greatly outweighs its interest in potential
consumer confusion about Mattel's sponsorship of [defendant] Forsythe's works"); Mattel, Inc.
v. MCA Records, 296 F.3d 894, 902 (9th Cir. 2002) (concluding, under the balancing test, that
the defendant's use of BARBIE GIRL in a song title and lyrics did not "explicitly mislead as to
the source [or content] of the work").
96. That is, none of the courts ended its analysis as soon as it identified the use in question
as artistic or parodic.
97. See, e.g., Dogan & Lemley, supra note 38, at 1682 n.57; cf Barrett, supra note 3, at 386.
98. New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g Inc., 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992).
99. Id. at 307.
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ButJudge Kozinski adopted no such rule. Instead, comparing trademark fair
• -100
use to the fair use defense in copyright, he laid out a nominative fair use
defense. In contrast to the trademark use theory, the New Kids nominative
fair use defense calls for courts to inquire into whether the defendant's use
suggests sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark owner,'0 ' whether
descriptive substitutes were available, and whether the defendant used more
of the mark than was necessary-all context-dependent inquiries at odds
with the formalism of trademark use. 
°0
Likewise, when clarifying the law of classical fair use in its KP Permanent
decision, the Supreme Court did not adopt a trademark use requirement,
nor did it adopt a methodology that calls for assessing use as a threshold
matter.10 3 The Court instead left the door open for courts to consider the
extent of likely confusion as one factor in determining whether a
defendant's use should be deemed fair.'0 4 On remand, the Ninth Circuit
accepted this invitation, setting out a context-driven analysis for the classical
fair use defense.10 5 The Third Circuit did likewise in fashioning a nominative
fair use defense that took account of KPPermanent.1
0 6
In sum, the analytical approach adopted in these permissible use
cases-and virtually all others-is a contextual balancing approach. The
cases do not turn on whether the defendant's use is otherwise than as a
mark. Instead, the nature of the use is but one factor. Claims to the contrary
are revisionist. More lavish claims that trademark use is "well established,"1
0 7
or a matter of "historical"10 8 mandate in the common law, seek to mask a
void in the descriptive foundation of the trademark use theory.
100. See id. In context, the relevant passage reads: "Cases like these are best understood as
involving a non-trademark use of a mark-a use to which the infringement laws simply do not
apply, just as videotaping television shows for private home use does not implicate the copyright
holder's exclusive right to reproduction." Id.
101. See id. at 308.
102. Id. The Ninth Circuit later explained that this analysis was a "replacement" for the
likelihood of infringement analysis. See Cairns v. Franklin Mint. Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1150 (9th
Cir. 2002); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 810 (9th Cir. 2002).
103. See supra text accompanying notes 84-85.
104. See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S, 111, 123
(2004). Indeed, assessment of confusion is but one of several considerations that the Court
accepted might inform whether the defense is made out. Id.
105. See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 408 F.3d 596, 607-09
(9th Cir. 2005) (holding that courts should analyze, among numerous other contextual factors,
the degree of likely confusion).
106. See Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lending Tree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 222-23 (3d Cir.
2005).
107. See Barrett, supra note 3, at 378 (suggesting that the "trademark use requirement is
well-established in the statutory language and the case law," although admitting that there is
"relatively little discussion" of the requirement in the case law).
108. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 3, at 798 (asserting that courts "historically" insisted
on trademark use by defendants and citing a single 2000 California district court case).
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III. A PRESCRIPTIVE CRITIQUE OF TRADEMARK USE
Having shown that trademark use has no firm grounding in current law,
we now turn to the claim that adopting a trademark use requirement would
advance the goals of the trademark system. We begin by outlining the search
costs rationale that animates much of trademark use theory. Our analysis
suggests that implementing trademark use as its proponents envision could
render trademark law impotent in many important areas of economic
endeavor.'0 9 We emphasize that trademark law has never been based on the
notion that the maximum amount of information flow is optimal for
consumers. Trademark law is intended to foster accurate and helpful
information, a formula that is much more complex than the binary analysis
of information generation/suppression that dominates the trademark use
debate. ' 10 Especially in a time of information overload, when the reliability
of dominant intermediaries may become crucial to consumer welfare, we
advocate greater policing than trademark use theory would permit.
We next challenge the argument that trademark use will construct a
climate of greater certainty with attendant benefits for new economic
activity."' Dogan and Lemley, and other trademark use theorists, make
much of this argument, claiming that trademark use will obviate the need
for confusion assessments in many cases, thus enhancing certainty and
reducing costs for those who aspire to structure their activities around uses
of others' marks. However, as we show, the concept of use in U.S. law has
historically proven to be unstable in the context of establishing rights. We
explain that in many cases use has operated as a proxy for other analyses-
including, most significantly, assessments of consumer association and likely
confusion. Accordingly, we are skeptical of claims that trademark use theory
will enhance the certainty of trademark analysis.
We also show that trademark use theories, as currently formulated, fail
to take into account contested notions about what it means for a designation
to operate as a "mark.""2 Trademark use theory may function as a back-door
mechanism for dismantling protections against product design trade dress
infringement and infringement by unauthorized merchandising. In these
key areas, where legitimate countervailing arguments about the scope of
protection deserve a full airing and a nuanced resolution, trademark use
theory would squelch the debate by deciding the matter a priori.
Finally, we conclude that trademark use should not be seen as a
panacea for every ill afflicting trademark law.' Trademark use inadequately
109. See infra Part III.A.3.
110. Cf Dogan & Lemley, Defenses, supra note 18, at 4 (noting that trademark law ensures a
"reliable" vocabulary for communications between producers and consumers).
111. See infra Part 111.B.
112. See infra Part III.C.
113. See infra Part III.D.
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reflects the multivalence of trademarks, and its adoption would impoverish
the policy debate in trademark law.'
14
A. b-A wS IN THE SlARCH COSTSJUSTIFICA TION FOR TRADEMARK USE
In the United States, two primary justifications have traditionally been
offered in support of trademark rights: to "protect the public so that it may
be confident that, in purchasing a product bearing a particular trade-mark
which it favorably knows, it will get the product which it asks for and wants to
get"; and to ensure that "where the owner of a trade-mark has spent energy,
time, and money in presenting to the public the product, he is protected in
his investment from its appropriation by pirates and cheats."" 5 In recent
years, Chicago School theorists have reformulated these dual purposes in
economic terms, explicitly grounding trademark protection in economic
efficiency. 1 6 The Chicago School arguments have resonated with many
scholars and courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court. As the Court
explained in Qualitex Company v. Jacobson Products Company:
[T]rademark law, by preventing others from copying a source-
identifying mark, "reduce[s] the customer's costs of shopping and
making purchasing decisions," for it quickly and easily assures a
potential customer that this item-the item with this mark-is
made by the same producer as other similarly marked items that he
or she liked (or disliked) in the past.'
v
Protecting the integrity of consumer understanding, by preventing
confusingly similar uses of'a mark by others, lowers consumer search costs.
Rival uses that interfere with consumer understanding increase consumer
• r • 118
search costs by making the mark a less reliable source of information.
114. Similar dangers can be seen in copyright law, where treating a number of different
exclusions under the rubric of the idea/expression distinction may have constricted the full
force of those exclusions. See Pamela Samuelson, Why Copyright Law Excludes Systems and Processes
From Its Scope of Protection, 85 TEX. L. REv. (forthcoming 2007).
115. S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 3 (1946), as reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1274.
116. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw 168 (2003) ("The value of a trademark to the firm that uses it to
designate its brand is the saving in consumers' search costs made possible by the information
that the trademark conveys or embodies about the quality of the firm's brand."); see also William
A. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30J.L. & ECON. 265, 289
(1987).
117. Qualitex Co. v.Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163-64 (1995) (citations omitted).
118. See Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1429-30 (7th Cir. 1985). As
the Scandia Down court explained:
Trademarks help consumers to select goods. By identifying the source of the
goods, they convey valuable information to consumers at lower costs. Easily
identified trademarks reduce the costs consumers incur in searching for what they
desire, and the lower the costs of search the more competitive the market. A
trademark also may induce the supplier of goods to make higher quality products
and to adhere to a consistent level of quality.
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Prominent trademark use theorists endorse the search costs rationale as
the primary justification for trademark law generally and for the trademark
use theory in particular.! 9 For example, Dogan and Lemley argue that:
Limiting trademark rights to a right to prevent confusing uses of
the mark as a brand helps to ensure that trademark rights remain
tied to their search costs rationale--only those individuals or
companies who are using the mark to advertise their own products
or services have the motive and opportunity to interfere with the
clarity of the mark's meaning in conveying product information to
consumers, and so only those uses ought to be of concern to
trademark law.
120
The search costs rationale thus supports both the imposition of
trademark infringement liability, as well as doctrines (such as genericide or
functionality) that limit the scope of trademark rights.
12 1
However, Dogan and Lemley have acknowledged that in some instances
the search costs argument will cut in both directions. 1 2 That is, allowing a
defendant to engage in the activities in question might impose search costs
(in some forms for some consumers) while reducing search costs in other
respects. In such instances, they argue that trademark law will impose a
limiting rule when the balance of search costs favors doing so, but they
acknowledge that courts in those contexts often try to capture the
information benefits of protecting consumer understanding by providing
limited forms of relief to trademark owners. 2 3 However, they argue that
there are some uses by a defendant that "unambiguously" reduce search
costs-such as, they claim, non-trademark use-and that such uses should
fall outside the scope of trademark rights.
2 4
In this Subpart of the Article, we show that the search costs rationale
does not support limiting trademark liability to uses by a defendant that
amount to trademark use. Our critique rests upon two basic convictions.
First, trademark law has a regulatory role to play in many of the contexts
Id. at 1429.
119. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 3 at 786-88; see also Dogan & Lemley, supra note 18, at
5; Barrett, supra note 3, at 392-93.
120. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 3, at 798; see also Barrett, supra note 3, at 378-79.
121. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 18, at 11.
122. See id. at 21-34.
123. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 3, at 793-94 (asserting that the law declares a term
generic "as soon as a critical mass of consumers treats the term as generic because the harm to
consumers who associate the term with the entire class of goods outweighs the harm to the
diminishing number who view it only as a mark," but also observing that courts sometimes
protect the de facto secondary meaning established by trademark owners in this situation, such
as by requiring the defendant to take steps to minimize confusion with the former mark
owner).
124. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 18, at 16 (listing trademark use as a rule of trademark
law premised upon the unambiguous reduction of search costs).
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from which trademark use theorists would evict it. In particular, it can be
effective in addressing information overload, rather than just in increasing
information flow to consumers. Second, the search costs rationale is
incomplete as an explanation of the prescriptive basis of trademark law. If
we expand the value system of trademarks beyond the scriptures of
economic efficiency, we may find an instrumental role for trademark law in
preserving real consumer choice and enhancing consumer autonomy.
1. Do Non-Trademark Uses Cause Confusion?
Trademark use theorists claim that only defendants that are using a
mark of another person "as a mark" will interfere with the clarity of the
mark's meaning, and thus, a vision of trademark law premised upon
reduction of search costs will justify enjoining only such uses. 115 This
proposition runs counter to a number of instances where third-party uses
other than as a mark have been found to be potentially actionable because
they cause confusion and disrupt consumer understanding. Most notably, it
is inconsistent with the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in KP Permanent
less than two years ago, in which the Court held that the classic fair use
defense-which is available when a defendant makes a good faith,
descriptive use of a mark otherwise than as a mark-could be made out even
where the defendant's use caused likely confusion. 12 6 The logic of that
holding is that some uses otherwise than as a mark can cause confusion and,
thus, increase search costs (even if trademark law might ultimately permit
the use under the fair use doctrine).12 7 And the facts in KPPermanent were by
no means unique. The Supreme Court's intervention was necessary because
numerous courts had held that defendants making non-trademark use of a
mark were causing confusion, but those courts split on whether the
existence of any confusion prevented a defendant from making out a fair
use defense.
128
125. It is unclear whether Dogan and Lemley would allow the contours of trademark use to
be informed (perhaps exclusively) by the search costs rationale. Does the search costs rationale
merely explain the trademark use doctrine or does it define the scope of trademark use? That
is, would any use by a defendant that reduced net search costs be characterized as a non-
trademark use (and, conversely, any use that increased search cost characterized as a trademark
use)? See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 3, at 810-11; cf Dogan & Lemley, supra note 38, at 1697
("If a party adopts its competitor's protected, non-functional product configuration in a way
that confuses potential customers over source, sponsorship, or affiliation, it is engaged in a
trademark use of that trade dress.").
126. KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impressions I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 123 (2004).
127. That is, the Court held that uses otherwise than as a mark will still be permitted under
the rubric of fair use in some circumstances (i.e., when used in good faith). On remand, the Ninth
Circuit held that the extent of confusion remained relevant to the question of good faith. See KP
Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impressions 1, Inc., 408 F.3d 596, 596 (9th Cir. 2005).
128. See KPPermanent, 543 U.S. at 122.
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The premise underlying these decisions is sound because the types of
use necessary to establish consumer understanding are plausibly different
from those uses that might interfere with extant consumer understanding and,
thus, increase search costs. 12 9 For example, if Nike had first used JUST DO
IT on a t-shirt, that use arguably would not have generated the consumer
understanding necessary to support trademark rights. But once that
slogan had become associated with Nike in the minds of consumers, its use
on a t-shirt by another trader would have clearly interfered with the integrity
of that association.' 3' Cognitive science studies offer some confirmation of
this intuition about the surprising range of acts that might interfere with1. 132
consumer understanding. Destroying meaning is far easier than
establishing it.I3 3
129. See supra text accompanying notes 63-66 (noting different purpose as relevant to
statutory interpretation).
130. See supra text accompanying note 74. Of course, slogans on t-shirts may also be treated
as use as a mark, depending upon whether the slogans are distinctive. See MCCARTHY, supra note
67, § 3.3 (noting the "common markers" of trademark use and concluding that "[tlhese and
other similar questions all relate to the ultimate question: Has the designation claimed as a
protectable mark been used in such a way as to make such a visual impression that the viewer
would see it as a symbol of origin separate and apart from everything else?").
131. We are not suggesting that Nike owns plenary rights over use of the term JUST DO IT,
an unlikely scenario that some supporting a trademark use theory have argued would result
from (among other things) rejecting trademark use. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 3, at 809;
cf Posting of Marty Schwimmer to the Trademark Blog, Will 'Where's The Beep.' Become
Actionable Under Proposed Dilution Law, http://www.schwimmerlegal.com/2006/02/will_
wheresthe.html (Feb. 18, 2006, 23:28 EST) (resting the ability of third parties to make political
use of "Where's The Beef" on a lack of trademark use). Rather, socially beneficial uses of JUST
DO IT, such as parodic use or its use in the resale of genuine goods, would be permitted under
theories that permitted analysis of those social benefits and not under a theory of trademark
use that consciously forecloses that debate through ontological classification.
132. See Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in 60 Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive Science, 86
TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007), available at www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/ipsc/
papers2/Tushnet.doc (discussing studies by Morrin and Jacoby and commenting that "as far as
we know, the brain has no use in commerce requirement"). The implications of these studies
might suggest a radically different trademark law, especially with regard to dilution protection.
See id. As Tushnet notes, whether trademark law should act on these studies of behavior raises
normative questions about the scope of trademark law and competing values. See id. at 3; see also
infta Part III.D. However, the Morrin and Jacoby studies do highlight weaknesses in the
empirical claim that only "use as a mark" can raise search costs.
133. The registration provisions of the Lanham Act also reflect concern that uses "other
than as a mark" might interfere with consumer understanding. Thus, section 2(d) of the
Lanham Act provides that a mark will be denied registration if it is confusingly similar to "a
mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office, or a mark or trade name previously used in
the United States by another." Lanham Act § 2(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (2000) (emphasis
added). Indeed, the courts and administrative offices have acted on the implicit premise of this
provision-namely, that non-trademark uses can cause consumer confusion-by expanding the
types of prior confusingly similar uses that might prevent registration to include "analogous
uses" of a mark that by definition do not constitute use as a mark. See Herbko Int'l, Inc. v.
Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2002); T.A.B. Sys. v. Pactel Teletrac, 77 F.3d
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In addition to decided cases, one could imagine hypothetical disputes 34
where a defendant's use that some might characterize as non-trademark use
would nonetheless generate consumer confusion. For example, a
defendant's use of a rival's mark as part of its corporate name would clearly
give rise to potential liability under the Lanham Act. We could not form a
new sports apparel company under the name "Nike Sneakers Inc." without
being subject to potential suit by Nike, Inc., owner of the trademark NIKE
for sneakers, even if we used the trademark ZAZU to sell our sneakers. Our
use of the term "Nike" surely gives rise to harm that would be treated as
actionable under a search costs based theory of trademark law (even if
consumers saw "Nike" as something other than a brand symbol). Existing
consumer understanding regarding NIKE is clearly being disrupted by our
use. However, our use of "Nike" would not qualify as use as a mark under the
definitions typically proffered by trademark use theorists because the term
"Nike" is not being used to identify goods and services, but rather is being
used as a "trade name."
136
As a matter of trademark law, our newly formed sports apparel company
could claim on the packaging for our sneakers that "ZAZU sneakers are
1372, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see also text accompanying notes 191-92 (discussing the likely
expansion of use doctrines to include constructive use if trademark theory is adopted).
134. Section 1202 of the Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure, which lists uses that
the Trademark Office does not treat as "trademark use" tor the purpose of establishing rights,
might provide a partial road map for an opportunistic defendant seeking to escape liability by
stretching the trademark use doctrine. See TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE §
1202 (4th ed. 2005) [hereinafter TMEP], available at http://tess2.uspto.gov/tmdb/
tmep//200.htm (listing trade names, functionality, ornamentation, informational matter, color
marks, goods in trade, columns or sections of publications, title of single creative work, names
of artists and authors, model or grade designations, background designs and shapes, and
varietal and cultivar names). But many of these uses by a defendant would implicate the
purposes of trademark law.
135. We do not doubt that some of these hypothetical disputes might test the resilience of
doctrines relating to the forms of actionable confusion and the range of permissible uses. Of
course, these hypothetical disputes would also severely stretch the trademark use theory,
including the definition of "trademark use" itself. See infra note 139; see also infra Parts III.B.4,
IlI.C. But that only confirms the wisdom of the Court's approach in KP Permanent, which
instructs courts defining the scope of trademark rights to look at more than just whether the
defendant's use was as a mark.
136. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (defining "trade name" as "any name used by a person to identify
his or her business or vocation"). See also Case C-245/02, Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Budejovicky
Budvar, [2004] E.C.R. I- 0989 (ECJ 2004) (EU) (holding that the use by defendant of plaintiffs
mark as a trade name fell within the rights of the trademark owner tinder Article 16(1) of TRIPS
but might be excused tinder an affirmative defense if done so in accordance with honest
commercial practices); cf Panel Report, European Communities-Protection of Trademark and
Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and Food Stuffs, WT/DSI 74/R (Mar. 15, 2005)
(essentially endorsing the same conceptual structure tinder international law for determining
whether defendant's use of plaintiffs mark as a geographical indication amounted to
trademark infringement).
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much cheaper and more comfortable than NIKE sneakers. 1 3 7 That use of
NIKE would be permitted because of a long-standing commitment in U.S.
law to encourage the use of comparative advertising, in the belief that such
uses do not cause confusion and in fact reduce search costs.' However, our
comparative advertising defense would depend upon proof of good faith. If
the comparative claim appeared entirely in eight-point, black type, except
for the term NIKE, which appeared in fifty-four point bright-red type, our
good faith is likely to be questioned. Substantial confusion would still be
likely, and thus courts would almost certainly impose liability. Trademark
use theory, by immunizing uses without regard to context, is unable to
regulate potentially confusing uses, and thus is unable to implement the
search costs theory on which it purports to be based." 9
137. Courts are unlikely to treat the inclusion of a term as part of a narrative sentence that
appears on the packaging of goods, or on the goods themselves, as use as a mark sufficient to
create trademark rights. See In re Aerospace Optics, Inc., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1861, 1862
(T.T.A.B. 2006).
138. Although we are confident that this analysis applies in all courts in the United States,
the precise doctrinal basis for the conclusion might vary from circuit to circuit. In some circuits,
the comparative advertising defense is arguably now encompassed within the nominative fair
use defense. But not all courts have adopted the test of nominative fair use as first developed by
the Ninth Circuit, and the Ninth Circuit has not yet revised its nominative fair use test to take
account of the decision of the Supreme Court in KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting
Impressions I Inc., 543 U.S. 111 (2004). For a thoughtful discussion of the challenges of doctrinal
formulation, see Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211 (3d Cir. 2005),
where the court concluded that to make out a defense of nominative fair use post-KP Permanent
a defendant must show: (1) that the use of plaintiffs mark is necessary to describe
both the plaintiffs product or service and defendant's product or service; (2) that
the defendant uses only so much of the plaintiffs mark as is necessary to describe
plaintiff's product; and (3) that the defendant's conduct or language reflect the
true and accurate relationship between [the] ... products.
Century 21, 425 F.3d at 222. The Ninth Circuit's nominative fair use test, which included a
requirement that there be no confusion as to affiliation or endorsement, will no doubt be
modified in light of KP Permanent. But the decision of the Ninth Circuit on remand in KP
Permanent regarding classic fair use suggests that the modified nominative fair use test might
simply require courts to take the extent of confusion into account, rather than making it
determinative. See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 408 F.3d 596,
609 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that to determine fairness for the purpose of the classic fair use
defense, a court should consider "the degree of likely confusion, the strength of the trademark,
the descriptive nature of the term for the product or service being offered by KP and the
availability of alternate descriptive terms, the extent of the use of the term prior to the
registration of the trademark, and any differences among the times and contexts in which KP
has used the term").
139. Perhaps trademark use theorists would argue that the use of the term NIKE in fifty-
four point bright red type in this hypothetical would in fact be "use as a mark," notwithstanding
its use as part of a narrative sentence. But this merely substantiates our basic argument: the
character of the defendant's use is ultimately a function of context. Indeed, some courts have
analyzed whether a defendant's use was "as a mark," and hence possibly fair use, by examining
whether the context suggests efforts to create confusion. See Sunmark, Inc. v. Ocean Spray
Cranberries, Inc., 64 F.3d 1055, 1059 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting that "when the products involved
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2. Search Engines and Search Costs: Information Overload
The disconnect between trademark use and nuanced search costs
analysis has become particularly evident in cases involving contextual
advertising by search engines. Trademark use scholars argue that the sale of
sponsored links by search engines does not constitute trademark use. They
assert that such use does not increase search costs. However, they exaggerate
the gains and minimize the costs of search engine activity and, thus, sidestep
the balancing exercise that they acknowledge to be an integral part of
deciding the "hard cases," namely where there are "search costs rationales
on both sides of the argument. Dogan and Lemley argue that "the rule
that competition and information dissemination trump trademark holder
economic interests applies with even more force if the use that a competitor
wishes to make of a trademarked term is one that unambiguously reduces
search costs." 14' That standard-"unambiguous reduction of search costs"-
is presently not close to being satisfied in the case of search engines. 
42
are similar, 'likelihood of confusion' may amount to using a word in a 'misleading' way,
violating 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)-not because the likelihood of confusion makes the use
nondescriptive, but because the confusion about the product's source shows that the words are
being used, de facto, as a mark. And the defense is available only to one who uses the words of
description 'otherwise than as a mark'"); see also Venetianaire Corp. of Am. v. A & P Import, 429
F.2d 1079, 1082 (2d Cir. 1970) (concluding that "[f]rom the mimicking of plaintiff's typestyle
and prominent display of the registered word 'Hygient' on its own 'Hygienic' package, it is
plain that A & P Import did not use the word 'otherwise than as a trade ... mark ... only to
describe its goods'; on the contrary, a 'trademark use,' was both effected and intended"); cf.
Dogan & Lemley, supra note 38, at 1681-82. Early lower court responses to KP Permanent suggest
that this might become a dominant mode of analysis. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying
text.
140. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 3, at 795. Although these cases are hard, at least they
involve the weighing of commensurables. The hardest cases for trademark law are cases that
require courts to weigh incommensurables such as search costs and free-speech values.
Trademark law has struggled badly to reason through those problems. See Dinwoodie, Social
Norms, supra note 29, at 22; Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as
Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397, 398-99 (1990).
141. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 3, at 795-97 (citing reuse of secondhand goods,
descriptive fair use, and fair use in comparative advertising).
142. Dogan and Lemley acknowledge that some trademark defenses do present ambiguous
cases from a search costs perspective. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 18, at 21. Their approach
to such cases highlights the importance of the ipse dixit assertion that non-trademark use
presents an unambiguous search costs scenario. Thus, they argue that "a legal doctrine
designed to minimize search costs should respond to the complex of consumer interests on
both sides of a genericide case by tending toward standards rather than absolute rules.
Trademark's fair use doctrine serves as an example." Id. at 26. We could not agree more. But we
think that such an analysis perfectly describes the policy choice presented by both trademark
and non-trademark use. Dogan and Lemley would treat fair use as a determination that the
reduction in search costs flowing from the defendant's use outweighs any interference with
consumer understanding. See id. However, this implicitly acknowledges that some uses otherwise
than as a mark (i.e., fair uses) can interfere with consumer understanding. As a result, under
their own reasoning, they should be compelled to demonstrate that such interference is
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In order to enhance the claims of social gains resulting from
unregulated search engine activity, trademark use theorists invoke the
standard mantra that more information regarding goods and services always
enhances social welfare. 4 " Thus, the argument goes, permitting search
engines to sell sponsored links tied to trademarks facilitates the provision to
the consumer of a range of additional, useful information regarding both
complementary and competitive goods and services. It is easy to exaggerate
the welfare-enhancing effects of increasing the quantity of information
delivered to consumers, especially because this predilection with short-term
quantity resonates with the deeply rooted political philosophy that drives
American speech jurisprudence. Trademark law generally favors the
production of more information, but its core focus is on the nature and
quality of the information for which it facilitates production. Therefore, we
should be cautious about unrefined claims that more information is always
better in the trademark context.
In assessing countervailing social costs that result from the sale of
sponsored links, trademark use theorists assume away the possibility that the
supply of additional information to consumers creates any negative
externalities.' 4 5 This cavalier dismissal flows from the basic premise of
trademark use theory that only use as a mark can interfere with consumer
understanding. As a result of characterizing the use by search engines as
non-trademark use, trademark use theorists inevitably reach the conclusion
that the sale or presentation of sponsored links create no consumer
confusion and, hence, impose no increase in search costs. 14 6 But, especially
trumped by positive effects on search costs. But they never do so because the trademark use
theory forecloses such analysis where the defendant's use is otherwise than as a mark.
143. Economic efficiency accounts of trademark law are typically premised on the notion
that more information is generally a social good. This philosophy supports the basic protection
of trademark law in the first place because trademark law encourages the production of
information regarding goods. It also supports a number of limits on trademark rights that
likewise encourage more information, such as the comparative advertising defense and the first
sale doctrine. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 3, at 795; Landes & Posner, supra note 116, at
206.
144. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Copyright and Free Speech, in COPYRIGHT AND FREE SPEECH 4
(Raquel Xalbarder ed., forthcoming 2007) ("To simplify somewhat, American free speech
attitudes appear premised on the assumption that more speech will ultimately result in good
speech, whereas Europeans are more willing to prohibit some forms of speech in the conviction
that good speech will create a climate in which more speech can occur."); cf OWEN Fiss, THE
IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 4 (1996) (articulating a view of the First Amendment that seeks to
support regulation of certain speech in order to further principles of equality and collective
self-determination).
145. The economic analysis of search costs propounded by trademark use theorists thus
rests on ontological classifications about the nature of use rather than on empirical assessments
of effects on consumers. This disregard of effects causes trademark use theorists to ignore costs
that might result uniquely from the nature of online information supply.
146. This conclusion, achieved swiftly through the application of trademark use theory,
conveniently meshes with the intuitive, but unsubstantiated, assumptions that trademark use
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in the context of online information supply, search costs for consumers may
be increased 147 as a result of information overload; 4 not all information
reduces search costs.1
49
Widespread and unregulated sale of trademark-generated sponsored
links may increase the "noise" that contributes to information overload and
simultaneously (because users are likely to view a finite number of links)
theorists make about consumer perceptions. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 3, at 812
(dismissing as "rather silly" a theory of confusion based upon "whether the advertiser is likely to
confuse consumers by placing its ad next to the search results generated by the trademark as
search term").
147. Of course, the primary cause of information overload is not intermediaries, but those
who produce the vast array of often unhelpful and annoying information, much of questionable
quality. See Frank Pasquale, The Law and Economics of Information Overload Externalities, 60 VAND.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) [hereinafter Pasquale, Externalities] (manuscript at 7, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=888410) (analyzing the scope of copyright protection taking into
account the negative externalities created by content owners through information overload).
Pasquale sees categorizers such as search engines as solutions to the problems of information
overload and, thus, wishes to "empower" them through more generous protection for the use
they make of copyrighted works. See id. at 11. And, in fact, search engines can assist navigating
this abundance of material by aggregating data and making it more readily accessible to
consumers. But the success of search engines in fulfilling their potential depends upon the ways
in which the information is organized and presented. Cf Frank Pasquale, Rankings,
Reductionism, and Responsibility, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 115, 130 (2006) [hereinafter Pasquale,
Rankings] ("[C] reative organization of data . . . can counteract the negative effects of
information overload. Unfortunately, ranking, a powerful and almost inevitable method of
organizing data, has its own negative externalities.").
148. The clutter that is generated by information overload, and which interferes with
consumer understanding, might be conceptualized under current U.S. law as a facet of dilution
by blurring. See DINWOODIE & JANIS, supra note 89, at 599; see also Mark A. Lemley, The Modem
Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1704 n.90 (1999) ("Clutter ...
imposes real costs on consumers."). The search costs rationale has also been invoked in
justifying and defining the scope of dilution protection. See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley,
What the Right of Publicity Can Learn from Trademark Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1197 (2006)
("[L]ike traditional trademark law, dilution properly understood is targeted at reducing
consumer search costs."). Thus, trademark use theorists would also impose the trademark use
requirement on plaintiffs alleging dilution. Indeed, prominent theorists testified in Congress in
support of introducing an explicit trademark use requirement in the recent reform of dilution
law, and the statutory amendments that were enacted will most likely be read to include such a
requirement. See Dilution Hearings, supra note 8, at 18-21 (testimony of Mark A. Lemley);
Dinwoodie &Janis, supra note 9, at 100. Contra Verimark (Pry) Ltd. v. BMW (AG), [20071 SCA
53, 63 (Republic South Africa, Court of Appeal, May 17, 2007) (finding trademark use to be a
requirement of an infringement cause of action but not in a dilution claim because dilution
aims "at more than safeguarding a product's 'badge of origin'").
149. See generally GREGG EASTERBROOK, THE PROGRESS PARADOX (2003); ORRIN KLAPP,
OVERLOAD AND BOREDOM: ESSAYS ON THE QUALITY OF LIFE IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (1986);
RICHARD LANHAM, THE ECONOMICS OF ATTENTION (2006); BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF
CHOICE (2004): Pasquale, Externalities, supra note 147; Lee Gomes, Our Columnist Creates Web
'Original Content' but Is in for a Surprise, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Mar. 1, 2006, http://online.
wsj.com/public/article/SB 114116587424585798-PEYnqy2bodjd5gcgeMQlcnxEQM_20070302.
html?mod=tff maintfftop ("The act of observing something changes it. Which is what search
engines are causing to happen to much of the world's 'information.' Legitimate information
... risks being crowded out by junky, spammy imitations. Nothing very useful about that.").
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lessens the reduction in search costs that might otherwise occur from
additional information." 0 Thus, the assumption that more information
always reduces search costs is especially dubious in the online world, and
may not even hold true in the offline world.' 5' Online, more information is
sometimes simply more; indeed, sometimes, more information is less.
3. Search Engines and Search Costs: Insufficient Regulation
The focus of trademark use theorists on search costs risks ignoring
broader effects that search engine practices might have on economic
efficiency and may result in insufficient regulation of those practices.
Trademark law has always taken into account broader economic concerns
than effects on consumer search costs; reduction in search costs is one piece
of the economic puzzle. 52 For example, allowing the unregulated sale of
sponsored links imposes additional defensive costs on trademark owners
that wish to use self-help (i.e., the purchase of the sponsored link keyed to
their own mark) to overcome the abdication of responsibility by trademark
law. To ensure that potential NIKE consumers are not bamboozled in their
efforts to reach the NIKE site, Nike, Inc. has purchased a sponsored link on
Google that appears in response to a query for NIKE. 53 This is a transfer of
150. Many activities create "noise" and contribute to information overload, but not all
should be actionable under trademark law. Cf KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting
Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 121-22 (2004) (some confusion is to be tolerated in certain
circumstances). Those beholden to search costs as the lodestar of trademark law must address
what levels of increased search costs they are willing to tolerate and why. This latter question
frequently requires a broader vision of trademark law and recognition of its multivalent
character. See infra text accompanying Part III.A.5 (incompleteness); see also supra Part III.A.1
(questioning the capacity of search costs to define trademark use).
151. It is at least arguable that the problems of information overload, which also exist
offline, are exacerbated online by the ease of communication and the very capacity to target
that makes contextual advertising attractive. Most context-generated advertisements are not
obviously background noise and, thus, plausibly command our attention. Thus, we might adopt a
different approach to the proliferation of spam, imposing criminal liability in some cases, than
we do to parallel mass-mail activities offline. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 7706 (West Supp. 2006) (creating
civil penalties for sending false or misleading e-mail to promote a business). Context, as we
stress throughout this Article, matters to trademark law just as it does to other forms of
marketplace regulation. Thus, unlike trademark use theorists, we regard analogies to offline
activities as relevant but hardly determinative.
152. For example, trademark law reflects a concern for preventing monopolies over
product markets through its limits on protection for generic germs or functional designs. See
Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Reconceptualizing the Inherent Distinctiveness of Product Design Trade Dress, 75
N.C. L. REV. 471, 502 n.89 (1997) (comparing treatment of generic terms and functionality
doctrine). Dogan and Lemley acknowledge these broader competition concerns on occasion.
See, e.g., Dogan & Lemley, supra note 3, at 795. But they characterize these as "preconditions to
consumer search." Dogan & Lemley, supra note 18, at 31.
153. Data show that most consumers will not scroll down below the tenth link in most
search results. While we doubt that this data conclusively determines the nature of consumer
shopping online, it does at least raise this issue as a genuine concern for manufacturers at
present. Edward Cutrell & Zhiwei Guan, An Eye-Tracking Study of Information Usage in Web
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wealth that arguably serves no economic purpose, especially if Nike would
have rationally determined not to make such a payment absent the fear that
a competitor would purchase the space and divert sales. 5 4 And this practice
is so prevalent that when SNICKERS chocolate bars recently achieved
intensified public attention through the use of new SNICKERS-related
marks such as PEANUTOPOLIS on advertisements, marketing experts
characterized the failure of the manufacturers of SNICKERS bars to
purchase sponsored links paralleling the new marks as a major commercial
155error.
In light of this broader economic perspective and the presently
uncertain nature of consumer understanding online, it is premature to
terminate the involvement of trademark law in the sale of keywords.' 56 There
is a role for trademark law in regulating the manner both in which the
fastest-growing form of advertising is sold and in which information is
presented to consumers online. 57 With regard to selling practices, for
example, Google's behavior in permitting the purchase of trademark-related
keywords arguably should be differentiated from that of Netscape, which at
one time insisted that any adult entertainment purveyors that wished to
purchase sponsored links include the PLAYBOY keyword as part of their
purchase.158 The most persuasive justification for differential treatment of
Google and Netscape might lie in this instance outside the search costs
Search: Variations in Target Position and Contextual Snippet Length, available at
ftp://ftp.research.microsoft.com/pub/tr/TR-2007-01.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2007).
154. Such payment may be particularly burdensome for small businesses. Indeed,
trademark use advocates have conceded that because the advertisements of certain small
businesses are unlikely to appear toward the top of so-called "organic, editorially driven" search
results, the "only practical option" for such businesses seeking to promote their products may
be the purchase of sponsored links. See Brief of Amici Curiae Intellectual Property Law Faculty
in Support of Affirmance, Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., Appeal No. 06-4881-CV, at n.1.
155. See Did-it.com, Snickers Misses Out on Huge Paid Search Opportunity, http://
did-it.com/blog/index.php/2006/07/21/snickers-misses-out-on-huge-paid-search-opportunity/
(last visited Feb. 27, 2007). Google advises third parties on how to receive higher rankings
(while penalizing those who rely on third parties to optimize ranking results in what are seen by
Google as inappropriate ways), and part of that advice includes purchasing sponsored links that
will rank more highly than rival sites.
156. It is premature to determine conclusively the reaction of consumers to information
presented in particular online formats. Indeed, even trademark use theorists concede that
"[s]earch technologies, as well as consumer practices and expectations, are constantly evolving
in a way that makes it impossible to assess the existence and the costs of consumer confusion."
Dogan & Lemley, supra note 3, at 784.
157. Cf Pasquale, Rankings, supra note 147, at 117 (arguing for tort liability for search
engines to the owners of webpages harmed by manipulated search engine rankings).
158. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1023 (9th Cir.
2004).
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rationale 159 and in the broader unfair competition grounding of trademark
law. 160
In addition to differences in particular keyword sales practices, courts
have also noted the differences between keyword sales and other forms of
online advertising. The Second Circuit, in 1-800 Contacts, while essentially
endorsing the trademark use theory, drew a line between the practices of
search engines and those of the defendant in that case, an online marketing
company that sold advertisers the right to have pop-up ads that were tied to
the search activity of a web user appear on the computer screen of that
user."" The search activity from which the "ties" were developed included
the use of trademarks. In immunizing the marketing company from
trademark liability, the court noted that "unlike several other internet
advertising companies, [the marketing company] does not 'sell' keyword
trademarks to its customers or otherwise manipulate which category-related
advertisement will pop up in response to any particular terms on the
internal directory." 162 Instead, the marketing company's software randomly
selected an advertisement from the corresponding product or service
category (membership in which required payment by the advertiser) to
159. However, if there are also larger adverse search cost consequences as a result of
Netscape's policy, their liability under trademark law should follow suit; trademark use theory
would prevent us from making a comparative judgment.
160. Perhaps a real American unfair competition law would allow a less ethic-regulatory
trademark law. Indeed, the question of search engine liability has been litigated in Europe in
part under the rubric of unfair competition. See, e.g., SA Louis Vuitton v. SARL Google France,
St6 Google Inc., Tribunal de grande instance [T.G.I.] [trial court] Paris, June 28, 2006 (Fr.)
(targeted advertising on search engine webpage), discussed by Evan Schuman, French Appeals
Court Rules Against Google, EWEEK, June 29, 2006, http://www.eweek.com/article2/
0,1895,1983434,00.asp; T. v. Dr. R., LG Dusseldorf [Dusseldorf Regional Court] Mar. 26, 2003,
JurPC Web-Dok, 144/2003, Abs. 1-42 (F.R.G.), available at http://www.jurpc.derechtspr/
20030144.htm; Reed Executive Plc v. Reed Business Information Ltd., [2004] EWCA (Civ) 159
(Ut), available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2004/159.html; Pretium
Telecom v. Jiggers, The Hague District Court, Nov. 12, 2004 (Neth.), available at
http://zoeken.rechtspraak.nl. Although the case law in Europe remains unsettled, there does
appear to be a greater risk of search engine liability under unfair competition law rather than
trademark law proper. See Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Google France, Cour d' appel [CA]
[regional court of appeal] Paris, June 28, 2006 (Fr.), available at http://www.
legalis.net/jurisprudence.php3?idrubrique=10 (search engine liable); SAS TWD Industries v.
Google France, Google Inc., Tribunal de grande instance [T.G.I.] [trial court] Nice, Feb. 7,
2006 (Fr.), available at http://www.legalis.net/jurisprudence.php3?idrubrique 10 (finding the
search engine not liable); Laurent C. v. Google France, Tribunale de grande instance [T.G.I.]
[trial court] Paris, Feb., 13, 2007 (Fr.), available at http://www.legalis.net/
jurisprudence.php3?id-rubrique=10 (finding Google potentially liable under tort principles but
not trademark law proper). For a discussion of the numerous opinions in Germany and France,
see generally Peter Ruess, Pop-Up Ads and Keywords in Europe, Fourteenth Annual Fordham
Conference on International Intellectual Property Law (April 2006) (on file with the authors).
See also infra note 221 (discussing differences between the United States and the European
Union).
161. See 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 411 (2d Cir. 2005).
162. Id.
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deliver to the user. 16 As a result, the court concluded that the marketing
company had not engaged in trademark use. I '4
The various distinctions that the 1-800 Contacts court highlighted
between the business models employed by different online intermediaries
would, however, have been far more persuasive if explicitly grounded in a
concern of trademark law, such as effects on consumers. The court did not
explain why these differences mattered. Moreover, despite the caution of
the Second Circuit in 1-800 Contacts, some courts and scholars are extending
its holding to the sale of sponsored links by search engines. 16 5 But treating
all such uses as outside the potential scope of the Lanham Act prevents
courts from giving weight to these (or other) distinctions, or developing case
law identifying those aspects of sales practices that best further the purposes
of trademark and unfair competition law. 166
Trademark law can also serve a valuable regulatory role with regard to
the presentation of search results. Indeed, regulating the presentation of
results by a search engine goes more directly to the core of trademark law;
the effect on consumers is less attenuated than in addressing sales policies
and practices by search engines. For example, the likelihood of consumers
being confused as a result of keyword practices may depend, in part, on the
clear differentiation between organic and sponsored links. 16 Yet, Google
over time has increased the font size of the sponsored links generated by its
Adwords program to match those of its organic results. 8 Likewise, there is
arguably a difference between Google's initially clear differentiation in the
presentation of organic and paid results, and the current user interface,
which displays sponsored links above and beside organic results and in a
background palate that more closely resembles that on which the organic
163. Id. at 412.
164. Id.
165. See Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 393 (N.D.N.Y. 2006); Brief of
Amici Curiae Intellectual Property Law Faculty in Support of Affirmance, Rescuecom Corp. v.
Google, Inc., Appeal No. 06-4881-CV.
166. The Wentworth court also sought to treat the sale of sponsored links differently as a
matter of law from pop-up ads. See generatlyJ.G. Wentworth v. Settlement Funding LLC, No. 06-
0597, 2007 WL 30115 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2007). But of course, there are ways in which the use of
sponsored links is arguably a preferable form of contextual advertising to pop-ups: pop-ups
often rely on spyware, are more intrusive than sponsored links, and appear after the user has
sought a specific destination. See Peter W. Becker et al., Muddy Waters: Evolving Law and Policy
in Internet Advertising, Paper Presented at Annual Meeting of the International Trademark
Association 28 (May 2007) (copy on file with the Iowa Law Review).
167. See Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 702 (E.D. Va. 2004)
(describing organic results as generated by "neutral and objective criteria"). Indeed, the
Federal Trade Commission has warned search engines to differentiate clearly between paid and
unpaid results. See Reuters, Search Engine Providers Address FFC Complaints, USA TODAY, July 2,
2002, available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2002/07/02/ftc-search-engines.htm.
168. See Google Ups Adwords Font Size, MICRO PERSUASION, Dec. 9, 2005, http://www.
micropersuasion.com/2005/12/google-ups-adwo.html.
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results appear. Trademark law should police when that differentiation is
insufficient to optimize effects on consumer search costs, but trademark use
doctrine would foreclose any meaningful role for trademark law. We reject
such an abdication of responsibility.
4. Prudential Concerns
The core lesson of the preceding arguments is that just as an
unauthorized use of a mark as a mark may be permitted under trademark
law for a number of reasons, so too a use otherwise than as a mark may be
actionable. To be sure, trademark uses are more likely to infringe; they still
represent the paradigmatic infringement case. Likewise, non-trademark uses
are on balance more likely to be justified or non-actionable in any number
of ways because they are less likely to implicate the core concerns of
trademark law. Thus, one might suggest that prudential concerns warrant
the adoption of the trademark use theory as an approximate, but acceptable,
proxy for the results courts will achieve through case-by-case contextual
adjudication. 69
However, such concerns are outweighed by a number of considerations
reflecting our preferred analytical approach to trademark law. For example,
in the context of keyword-triggered advertising, trademark use theorists
reach their conclusion about the effect of search engine activity on search
costs not by any empirical analysis of that activity, but rather simply by
labeling the type of use. As a result, their conclusion rests heavily on
conjecture. Such an approach, by theorists purportedly implementing the
Chicago School analysis of search costs, ignores an important broader lesson
of the Chicago School, namely to foreswear formalistic reasoning.17 0 As
Judge Easterbrook has noted about another label-centric aspect of
trademark doctrine, namely distinctiveness, "the vocabulary of trademark
law may confuse more readily than they illuminate . . . , a caution litigants
should take seriously before arguing cases so that everything turns on which
word we pick. It is better to analyze trademark cases in terms of the
functions of trademarks."' 7' The 1-800 Contacts court clearly thought that the
sale of pop-up ads by WhenU.com was different from the sale of keywords by
169. The Supreme Court, at least, presently seems enamored with rough proxies in
trademark law. See Dinwoodie, Rehnquist, supra note 29, at 206-07; see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 212-15 (2000). Prudential concerns suggest that trademark law
should act to enjoin harmful conduct only where the gains of doing so outweigh the costs.
Those costs may be generated both by barriers to legitimate market activity induced by
uncertainty or compliance obligations and by the demands placed upon administrative and
judicial institutions to make excessively accurate assessments of consumer understanding. See
Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, 90 VA. L. REV. 2099, 2123-25 (2004);
Dinwoodie, Social Norms, supra note 29, at 10.
170. See McClure, Trademarks and Competition, supra note 25, at 31.
171. Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1431 n.3 (7thCir. 1985).
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Google.172 Trademark use theorists would compel courts to draw that line by
applying a different label to the respective activities of the two companies.
Our solution is more modest: allow the litigants to demonstrate that the two
uses have different effects with respect to those issues (e.g., consumer
confusion) of concern to trademark law.
If, in fact, one sought to discern the current effect of search engine-
generated results on consumers, one might well find confusion. But the
nature and extent of that confusion, both important in determining liability,
are still unclear. At the very least, the effect of these search results on
consumers is an open question. 73 The Chicago School analysis of the
economics of trademark law rests on simple (and relatively uncontested)
premises about consumer shopping behavior. 174 However, highly dynamic
information environments put pressure on the explanatory power of a
generalized model. It is presently impossible to know what meaning
consumers attach to search terms and search results or what expectations
flow from the use of different search methods. 17- As a result, we are reluctant
to follow an approach to trademark law that jettisons attention to context.
The solution of trademark use theory to the individualization and
complexity of modern shopping is to assume it away.
Trademark use theorists further elide any complexity by analogizing to
use of marks offline. For example, courts and scholars advocating the
trademark use theory routinely compare search engine activity to the
placement of generic products beside their branded equivalent in retail
stores. 176 While analysis of such offline activity may be instructive in
identifying the ways in which positive externalities are captured by market
participants, as Eric Goldman's current research shows, consumer
172. See 1-800 Contacts Inc., v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 411 (2d Cir. 2003).
173. Compare Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 700 (E.D. Va.
2004), with PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PRQJECT, SEARCH ENGINE USERS 18 (2005) (finding
that only one in six searchers can consistently distinguish between paid and unpaid search
results).
174. See generally LANDES & POSNER, supra note 116; Landes & Posner, supra note 116.
175. See Goldman, supra note 3, at 521 ("Simply put, one cannot make any legally-
supportable inferences about searcher objectives based on the keywords used."). ContraJennifer
E. Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion: Standing at the Crossroads of Trademark Law, 27 CARDOzO L.
REv. 105, 108 (2005) (making assertions regarding consumer response to hypothetical query
and search result).
176. See, e.g., Dogan & Lemley, supra note 3, at 810 (analogizing to the legitimate practice
of placing generic drugs on store shelves adjacent to brand name equivalents and noting that
drug "stores are not liable for 'accepting' the placement"). Of course, in assessing the
usefulness of this analogy, one might also take note of the recent scandals surrounding the use
of payments to encourage the listing of music on radio playlists or the placement of books in
the front of retail stores, in large part because the distributors of information in those instances
do serve as trusted filters by the public. Jeff Leeds, CBS Radio Tightens Policies in Settlement over
Payola, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2006, at C3.
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understanding in the context of bricks-and-mortar retail stores is much
more stable than we currently see in the online context.1
71
Despite all these concerns, policymakers may decide that potential long-
term gains from allowing search engines to offer information tied to the
trademarks of rival producers warrant discounting short-term confusion
among consumers. This would seem a plausible, proactive policy to adopt,
but it is wholly unrelated to the principles underlying trademark use.
Indeed, discussion of that policy and relative social values of paternalism,
information overload, and education of consumers are foreclosed by the
assertion of the trademark use theory.
5. Incompleteness
Finally, notwithstanding its dominant place in contemporary trademark
thought, search costs theory fails to provide a comprehensive explanation
of,'7 or prescriptive basis for, trademark law. 79 Trademark use doctrine
instantiates this incomplete conception of trademark and unfair
competition law not only by its (supposedly) rigid adherence to search costs
in defining rights, but also by consciously precluding consideration of other
values. This prescriptive incompleteness is again perhaps best illustrated by
177. See generally Eric Goldman, Brand Spillovers (Aug. 3, 2006) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with the Iowa Law Review).
178. Much trademark law is informed (explicitly or implicitly) by other social values. This is
evident even in the pronouncements by courts that are seen as endorsements of the search
costs rationale. See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v.Jacobson Prods., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995). For example,
the Qualitex Court explained the purposes of trademark law in the following terms:
At the same time, the law helps assure a producer that it (and not an imitating
competitor) will reap the financial, reputation-related rewards associated with a
desirable product. The law thereby 'encourage[s] the production of quality
products,' and simultaneously discourages those who hope to sell inferior products
by capitalizing on a consumer's inability quickly to evaluate the quality of an item
offered for sale.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
179. See Margaret J. Radin, A Comment on Propertization and Its Legal Milieu, 54 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 23, 32 (2006); see also Dinwoodie, Rehnquist, supra note 29, at 209. Conventional American
intellectual property scholarship, heavily driven by economic analysis, assumes that free-iding
should not give rise to liability absent some justification grounded in the economics of
innovation. But trademark and unfair competition law have historically reflected values, such as
commercial ethics, in addition to concerns of economic efficiency. See McKenna, supra note 2,
at 1848, 1860. Trademark use theory reflects a relatively narrow prescriptive vision in assuming
that free riding implicates no other normative commitments. For example, in Europe, keyword
advertising disputes have been litigated in part under the rubric of unfair competition, rather
than trademark infringement proper. See supra note 160. Unfair competition implicates
questions of honest commercial practices much more directly than do theories grounded in
economic efficiency. The values of commercial ethics are, however, retained in the current U.S.
trademark statute in the concept of good faith found in the fair use defense in section 33(b) (4)
of the Lanham Act.
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the application of the doctrine to curtail discussion of the relationship
between trademarks and search engines.
As envisioned in search costs theory, trademark law should demonstrate
a fidelity to the market, which tends, in turn, to exalt the market's defining
philosophical and political principle, namely freedom. The notion of
consumer choice is increasingly seen as a marker of economic, social, and
political freedom. By adopting legal rules (like trademark use) that venerate
one conception of choice, trademark law is supposed to be bolstering the
economic goal of an efficient marketplace and the political ideal of
freedom. However, as trademarks assume a greater social significance and
business models elevate trademark law as a principal tool of information
policy,'18 trademark law may have to take into account concerns about
individual autonomy that range more broadly than mere marketplace
choice.
1 8 1
For example, in an online world structured pervasively by search
engines that facilitate information flows to consumers, search costs theory
may predict substantial benefits from that search engine activity (e.g., by
allowing consumers to see a range of price options for the same product).
I 2
But in some cases, apparent enhancements of consumer choice may be.
180. See Chris Nuttall, Way of the Web: Start Ups Map the Route as Big Rivals Get Microsoft in
Their Sights, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2005, at 17 (discussing Microsoft's assessment of future
business models).
181. One of us develops this argument more fully elsewhere. See Dinwoodie, Social Norms,
supra note 29, at 31. As discussed more fully in Trademark Law and Social Norms, this implicitly
raises a question of institutional implementation: to whom should we direct these observations
regarding the political ideals implicated by trademark law? See id. To the extent that the
broadening of vision that we advocate here would reach so far as to question basic tenets about
the role of advertising and the creation of consumer preferences in society, the argument is
aimed more at scholars and policymakers (though hopefully it might at least cause courts to
exercise caution). See id. We suspect that one of the explanations for the attractiveness of the
trademark use theory is that its proponents may doubt the capacity of the political process to
conduct a broader conversation about the role of trademarks. However, we have great faith that
the likely beneficiaries of a trademark use doctrine-such as internet intermediaries-will be
well-represented in the political process and will press for a thorough airing of their
perspective. Cf Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, § 43(c) (3) (A), 15 U.S.C.A § 1125(c)
(West Supp. 2006) (excluding the facilitation of fair use from dilution liability). Indeed, our
primary concern would be that the critique of trademark use would rest only on the assertion of
absolute property rights by trademark owners, which is the type of blinkered analysis that we
seek to avoid.
182. See generally Lucas D. Introna & Helen Nissenbaum, Shaping the Web: Why the Politics of
Search Engines Matters, 16 INFO. SOc'Y 169 (2000) (offering an assessment of the benefits of
search engines). See also Jon Garvie, Search Parties, TIMES LITERARY SUPP., Feb 10, 2006, at 31
(reviewingJOHN BATTELLE, THE SEARCH: How GOOGLE AND ITS RIVALS REWROTE THE RULES OF
BUSINESS AND TRANSFORMED OUR CULTURE (2006), and MICHAEL STRANGELOVE, THE EMPIRE OF
MIND: DIGITAL PIRACY AND THE ANTI-CAPITALIST MOVEMENT (2006)); see also supra Part III.A.1
(arguing that the search costs analysis is not without some doubt). It is also possible that, when
values other than search costs are considered, one might conclude that contextual advertising
has substantial social benefits and should still be permitted, even where it makes extensive use
of trademarks as part of the sales or indexing process.
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illusory, reflecting not the capacity for autonomous action by individuals but
simply obedience to third-party insinuations (e.g., about how desirable it
would be for a consumer to purchase sets of complementary goods based
upon prior necessity-grounded purchases) I3 Economically well-off
consumers may see an expansion in choice (facilitated, for example, by
online contextual advertising) as a symbol of economic, social, and political
freedom. By contrast, less formally educated and poorer consumers may see
choice in more ambivalent terms, much less intimately bound to political
freedom. s4 Thus, even if the use of marks by search engines does reduce
search costs, these broader policy concerns might counsel against such uses
receiving immunity under trademark use theory. 1
5
183. Moreover, recent studies suggest that the benefits of enhanced consumer choice may
have a worrisome correlation with class. See BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE: WHY
MORE IS LESS (2004); Barry Schwartz, Hazel Rose Markus & Alana Conner Snibbe, Is Freedom Just
Another Word for Many Things to Buy?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb 26, 2006, at 14; cf Pasquale,
Externalities, supra note 147, at 56 n.178 (suggesting that "[l]ow-income internet users are
probably the worst affected by overload externalities"). Of course, to some extent, existing
trademark law-purporting to act on empirical market realities-contains the seeds of class
differentiation in a number of doctrinal devices. And it is hardly clear how trademark law
should accommodate the data from these studies.
184. See Schwartz et al., supra note 183, at 15. Schwartz argues:
While the upper and middle classes define freedom as choice, working class
Americans emphasize freedom from instability. These perspectives echo the
distinction between freedom to and freedom from made by Franklin Roosevelt and
the philosopher Isaiah Berlin half a century ago .... [W]hat freedom is, and
where it should be nurtured and where constrained, are hotly contested issues.
Id. Indeed, to paraphrase Schwartz, what choice is, and where it should be nurtured or
constrained, are hotly contested issues-or, at least, they should be.
185. Contextual advertising also implicates a range of other social concerns. For example,
Google has acknowledged that it has
considered every potential targeting option, [but has] come back every time to the
idea that the trust of the user is paramount .... After the initial outcry over
Google's Gmail service, which displays ads based on the content of individual e-
mail messages, the company has been wary of taking actions that would raise
privacy concerns.
Hansell, supra note 23, at Cl. Thus, Google has not yet used "behavioral targeting," which relies
on tracking what people do online. See id.; see also BATTELLE, supra note 182, at 98 (arguing that
"search will rewire the relationship between ourselves and our government"); Garvie, supra note
182, at 31 (noting that advances in search functions "propel individuals into relationships of
greatly increased trust and reliance with scarcely comprehensible digital systems" and that "as
the search industry becomes increasingly geared towards inference, the role of individual
agency, online and off, will be subtly abrogated"). Trademark law is only one means of
addressing these broader concerns. Our instincts are that the common law system of
adjudication (even with some statutory structuring) might prove more appropriate for the
dynamic nature of online searching than detailed governmental regulation, but there may be a
role for more than one regulatory mechanism. See Pasquale, Rankings, supra note 147, at 135
(suggesting that the Federal Trade Commission "could further advance fair competition in the
search market by requiring large search engines to put in place basic procedural protections for
those potentially harmed by query results").
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This inquiry into the social utility of search engines brings into play
questions raised in contemporary scholarship questioning more generally
the social utility of constructing behavior around brands.1 8 6 It is also
reminiscent of an earlier wave of scholarly literature, more vibrant in the
social sciences than in law, that expressed concern regarding the utility of
validating consumerist and materialist impulses."' Thus, it is not clear how
trademark law should shape the relationship between consumers and
information intermediaries in light of social values broader than economic
efficiency. 8s
Our point here is not to argue that materialism promoted by
encouraging complementary purchases is a social ill or that trademark law
should be radically redrawn as a consequence of this critique. Instead,
resolution of such policy dilemmas is only partly informed by search costs
analysis and partly informed by values that are either exogenous to search
costs or are not readily assimilated into search costs calculations. Trademark
use theorists would shut out these values on the basis of an assumed
conclusion regarding the effects of non-trademark use on search costs. 8 9
Trademark policy should not be set by so narrow a prescriptive principle.
B. FALSE DETERMINACY
Another prescriptive claim made on behalf of the trademark use theory
is that it promises determinacy. Proponents argue that the trademark use
186. See generally, e.g, NAOMI KLEIN, No LOGO (2002).
187. See generally JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (1967). There
were exceptions within the legal academy. See generally, e.g., Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and
the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165 (1948). But trademark law
largely resisted those arguments.
188. See Eric Goldman, A Coasean Approach to Marketing, 4 Wis. L. REv. 1151, 1152-56
(2006). Of course, the root source of these concerns might be expansive protection for
trademarks, as well as broader societal impulses toward the devaluation of education and the
elevation of material wealth. Restraining the use of trademarks by third parties thus might seem
to be the wrong target for scholars concerned with these developments. A critical analysis of
brands might support the generalized contraction of the ability of trademark owners to control
merchandizing that trademark use theory might cause. On the other hand, some forms of
strong intellectual property, especially if reoriented toward the interest of individuals, can serve
audience or public interests. Cf Justin Hughes, "Recoding" Intellectual Property and Overlooked
Audience Interests, 77 TEX. L. REv. 923, 940-52 (1999). As a third alternative, it might also be that
third party use of brands that interferes with merchandizing practices should be more freely
permitted in some contexts than others. See GRAEME B. DINWOODIE & MARK D. JANIS,
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 4 (Supp. 2006-07) (questioning whether the generation
of merchandising income by Britney Spears raises the same normative questions as when that
income is raised by universities). But these assessments are not dependent (and only barely
informed by) any analysis of search costs. Yet, trademark use theory narrows the debate to a
question of search costs.
189. Indeed, trademark use proponents would exacerbate the impoverishment of
trademark policy debate by drawing into the concept of trademark use all of the various
permissible use doctrines and dressing them up in the restrictive language of search costs.
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requirement serves a "gatekeeper function" in infringement litigation,
cutting off liability "without regard to a factual inquiry into consumer
confusion" in cases where the defendant's activity does not qualify as use as a
mark.1 90 As such, the trademark use requirement theoretically offers
defendants a weapon by which to secure summary judgment, reducing
litigation costs, avoiding the uncertainties of proving confusion, and
providing a bulwark against abusive claims of trademark infringement.
Given the concern with determinacy that, in large part, motivates
trademark use theory, a use-based concept might seem to be an attractive
vehicle by which to pursue those goals because its adoption promises
structural symmetry in trademark rules.1 9 ' Under such a view, the trademark
use requirement for establishing trademark rights would mirror the
trademark use requirement for infringing trademark rights, and progress
toward determinacy in one theoretically would carry over to the other.
Moreover, the implication is that rules developed over several decades in the
context of establishing rights could be transplanted into the context of
enforcing trademark rights, with all the attendant certainty benefits that one
might expect when relying on an established jurisprudence. However,
symmetry in the rules of trademark use cannot be assumed ipse dixit to be
normatively desirable. As we have shown, the nature of use required to
establish consumer association might be quite different from the nature of
unauthorized use that interferes with that association.19 2 Questions of
symmetry aside, the creation of a trademark use prerequisite for trademark
liability would not achieve greater determinacy in any event. Long
experience suggests that the trademark use doctrine is a dreadful candidate
for the role of gatekeeper. In the contexts in which explicit trademark use
rules have been applied most frequently-disputes about priority of rights
and their geographic scope-trademark use has had a checkered history
that would be likely to repeat itself in the infringement context.
190. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 3, at 805; see also Barrett, supra note 3, at 379 (asserting
that trademark use requirement would "shelter[] certain unauthorized but information-
enhancing uses of marks without necessitating a factual inquiry into the issue of consumer
confusion"); Dogan & Lemley, supra note 3, at 831, 836 (making similar assertions).
191. The prospect of symmetry is especially attractive to those who see trademark use as a
pervasive, animating theme in trademark. See, e.g., Widmaier, supra note 3, at 626-27
(advocating a "holistic approach" in which the analysis of trademark use in the context of
establishing tights "is no different in principle" from the analysis of trademark use in the
infringement context). Elsewhere, we attack more comprehensively the assertions that
trademark use should be, or is, the central dogma of trademark law. See generally Dinwoodie &
Janis, supra note 43 (critiquing the philosophy of trademark use "essentialism" and showing that
rubrics such as consumer association, with its built-in contextualist approach, have more
powerful explanatory force in trademark law).
192. See supra Part II.A, III.A.
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1. The Development of Ancillary Use Doctrines
When trademark law has sought to impose rules based on actual use,
courts invariably have reconfigured those rules. Courts have evaded the
constraints of actual use, sometimes for good reasons, by developing
ancillary doctrines of use tailored to implement a range of policy choices or
to respond to the equities in particular disputes. For example, experience
demonstrates that rules requiring actual use tend to become encrusted with
constructive use doctrines. One notorious illustration is the rise and fall of
the token use doctrine. Courts recognized that strict insistence on actual use
as a precondition to the establishment of registered rights might create
barriers to new market entry and, thus, impede competition. Accordingly,
they departed from strictures of actual use and allowed mere "token uses" of
a mark to suffice to establish rights. Eventually, Congress realized the
importance of permitting rights based upon constructive use and enacted
the intent-to-use scheme under which a trademark claimant can apply for a
trademark registration on the basis of a declaration of intent to use the mark
in the future.'9 3
And there are numerous other examples where activities that do not
appear to qualify as actual use nevertheless have been given legal effect,
either by an exception to the use doctrine or by reinterpretation of what
constitutes "use in commerce."' 1 4 Thus, a trademark claimant's activities that
do not qualify as actual use, but which are deemed "analogous" to actual use,
may be considered sufficient to establish priority over rival producers.
95
Likewise, a trademark claimant that uses a mark only within a certain
geographic area might be granted common law rights whose scope extends
into other areas into which the claimant might later "naturally expand." 96 A
trademark claimant that uses a mark only outside the United States might be
accorded protection in the United States if the mark is well-known here.
97
These cases reflect an inherent quality of actual use rules: they multiply into
bundles of actual and ancillary use concepts. This is no prescription for
determinacy.
193. The intent-to-use regime became a part of U.S. trademark law via a 1988 legislative
package. See DINWOODIE &JANIS, supra note 89, at ch. 4. Congress simultaneously abolished the
judicially developed token use doctrine, the purposes of which were now furthered more
efficiently by the intent-to-use provisions. See id.
194. For one prominent recent example of reinterpretation, see Intl Bancorp, LLC v. Societe
des Bains de Mer et du Cercie des Etrangers a Monaco, 329 F.3d 359, 380-81 (4th Cir. 2003).
195. See, e.g., Herbko Int'l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(reciting the analogous use test).
196. See McCARTHY, supra note 67, § 26.2; see also Tally-Ho, Inc. v. Coast Cmty. Coll. Dist.,
889 F.2d 1018, 1027-28 (1lth Cir. 1989) (suggesting criteria for the definition of the zone of
expansion).
197. See, e.g., Grupo Gigante v. Dallo & Co., Inc., 391 F.3d 1088, 1093 (9th Cir. 2004); Int'l
Bancorp, 329 F.3d at 381. But see ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2007).
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2. Uncertainty in Actual Use Inquiries
Even where courts purport to be assessing actual use, those assessments
are anything but crisp. Courts in these cases frequently trade certainty for
individualized appraisals of context. For example, many courts expressly
analyze actual use by considering the "totality of circumstances,"'
98
notwithstanding the detailed and apparently rigid statutory articulation of
"use in commerce. ' 99 Under this approach, use may be established in some
cases absent sales, but in other cases, sales may be insufficient. °00 Mere
advertising is not enough to establish use of a mark, but coupled with other
non-sales activities, advertising may be relevant.20' The transport of marked
goods might establish use, but it might not.
2
3. A Diagnosis: Use as Proxy
The regularity of these departures from bright-line, actual use rules can
be explained as efforts to vindicate the basic purposes of trademark and
unfair competition law. Courts have discounted the apparent certainty of
strict actual use in order to give effect to other values, such as facilitating
economic expansion, inter-mark-owner equities, and protecting consumer
understanding.2 3 But these values undergird many other well-established
198. See Planetary Motion, Inc. v. Techsplosion, Inc., 261 F.3d 1188, 1195 (11 th Cir. 2001);
Chance v. Pac-Tel Telectrac, Inc., 242 F.3d 1151, 1158 (9th Cir. 2001).
199. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
200. See Planetary Motion, 261 F.3d at 1195-96; New England Duplicating Co. v. Mendes, 190
F.2d 415, 418 (1st Cir. 1951).
201. SeeNew W. Corp. v. NYM Co. of Cal., Inc., 595 F.2d 1194,1200 (9th Cir. 1979).
202. See Paramount Pictures Corp. v. White, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1768, 1773-75 (T.T.A.B.
1994).
203. Pressures to adjust notions of use to reflect the exigencies of particular historical
moments are unlikely to subside. The use of trademarks online presents a recent example. The
inevitably cross-border character of such use creates a tension between the global nature of
modern trade and the continuing territoriality of trademarks. This prompted the World
Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") to develop provisions on the concept of use on
the Internet, which were adopted as ajoint Recommendation by the WIPO General Assemblies
and the Paris Union in 2001. See Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the
Protection of Marks, and Other Industrial Property Rights in Signs, on the Internet, adopted by
Assembly of the Paris Union for the Protection of Industrial Property and the General Assembly
of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), at the Thirty-Sixth Series of Meetings
of the Assemblies of the Member States of WIPO, WIPO Doc. 845(E) (Sept. 24-Oct. 3, 2001),
available at www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/developmentLiplaw/doc/pub845.doc. Under the Joint
Recommendation, use of a sign on the Internet should only be treated as use in any particular
state if the use of the sign has a commercial effect in that state. See id. art. 2. Thus, online use of
a mark in France will not necessarily be treated as use of the mark in the United States
sufficient to acquire rights or to infringe the rights of others. See generally Graeme B. Dinwoodie,
Private International Aspects of the Protection of Trademarks, WIPO Doc. No.
WIPO/PIL/01/4 (Jan. 31, 2001) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.
wipo.int/portal/index.html.en (search "WIPO/PIL/01/4"); Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Developing
a Private International Intellectual Property Law: Transnational Dialogue as a Lawmaking
Institution (Mar. 22, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Iowa Law Review). This
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trademark doctrines. Thus, many cases nominally decided on the basis of
use dissolve into analyses suspiciously similar to those of other doctrines
such as distinctiveness and likelihood of confusion. 20 4 So employed, use
functions principally as a proxy. It makes no autonomous analytical
contribution.
205A recent case, In re Aerospace Optics, Inc., illustrates how judges
transform trademark use into a proxy for distinctiveness. The applicant
sought to register a stylized version of the word SPECTRUM for use on
various aviation products, submitting specimens of use that showed the use
of the word as part of a sentence in point of sale brochures. 6 The examiner
had rejected the application on the ground that "the manner in which the
applied-for mark is used on the specimens of use is not indicative of
trademark use. On appeal, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
recited a trademark use prerequisite for establishing rights but cast that
prerequisite in the language of distinctiveness: use for the purpose of
establishing rights would be satisfied only when the designation was "used in
such a manner that it would be readily perceived as identifying the specified, ,208
goods and distinguishing a single source or origin of the goods. , ssessing
whether a designation was used in such a manner required attention to
context-including as a "critical element" the "impression" that the
209designation made on consumers.
development highlights two essential lessons. First, this refinement of the concept of use has
been prompted not by a deeper philosophical understanding about the nature of "use," but
rather by the pragmatic demands of global trade and online commerce. Second, reflecting that
instrumental character, whether use has occurred will be determined by the effects of that use
because those effects trigger the core concerns of trademark law. Attempting to separate use
from its context and its effect is futile, and claims of determinacy based on such line-drawing
are accordingly questionable.
204. In articulating the totality of the circumstances test, the Eleventh Circuit tied actual
use directly to consumer association and required courts to inquire into "the activities
surrounding" the use of the mark to determine whether consumer association was established.
See Planetary Motion, Inc. v. Techsplosion, Inc., 261 F.3d 1188, 1195 (11th Cir. 2001).
205. In reAerospace Optics, Inc., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1861, 1862-63 (T.T.A.B. 2006).
206. Specimens of use are intended to help the trademark examiner determine whether
the term is likely to be seen by consumers as connecting the goods to a single source. See In re
Safariland Hunting Corp., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1380, 1381 (T.T.A.B. 1992); see also TMEP,
supra note 134, at § 1202.
207. Aerospace Optics, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1862 (characterizing the examiner's
rejection).
208. Id.
209. Indeed, as if to highlight the fact that one cannot determine whether use is use as a
mark without attention to context, the Board recognized that the mark would have been
registered if used in a different context. Id. at 1864. Whether a mark is distinctive depends both
on its inherent meaning and the way it is used. For similar examples demonstrating that use as a
mark has no ontological meaning, see, e.g., In re Volvo, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1455, 1457
(T.T.A.B. 1998) (holding that DRIVE SAFELY failed to function as a mark for automobiles and
structural parts when the phrase appeared within a paragraph of text in an advertisement); In
re Manco, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1938, 1942 (T.T.A.B. 1992) (concluding that THINK GREEN
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And this phenomenon of use as a proxy is by no means limited to
distinctiveness. When a trademark examiner rejects an application on the
ground that the applicant failed to show use as a mark, that rubric is likely to
be functioning as a proxy for one of numerous other trademark doctrines
and sub-doctrines, including functionality.2 Thus, experience suggests that,
in application, use-based rules are inseparable from other contextual
trademark standards (such as distinctiveness or confusion). In that light, to
suggest that one approach imparts greater determinacy than the other is a
non sequitur. 211
4. Lessons for Trademark Use in the Infringement Context
There is, therefore, no reason to expect that creating a threshold
trademark use requirement for infringement will lead to greater certainty.
The experience recounted above suggests that a trademark use requirement
will become fertile ground for the development of ancillary use doctrines,
and that assessments of trademark use are likely to incorporate
failed to function as a mark for mailing and shipping cardboard boxes when used on such
boxes because it would be perceived as an informational slogan devoid of trademark
significance).
210. The TMEP goes so far as to instruct its examiners that
[w]hen the examining attorney refuses registration on the ground that the subject
matter is not used as a trademark, the examining attorney should explain the
specific reason for the conclusion that the subject matter is not used as a
trademark .... [F]or a discussion of situations in which it may be appropriate,
depending on the circumstances, for the examining attorney to refuse registration
on the ground that the asserted trademark does not function as a trademark,
e.g.,TMEP §§ 1202.01 (trade names), 1202.02(a) et seq. (functionality), 1202.03
(ornamentation), 1202.04 (informational matter), 1202.05 (color marks), 1202.06
(goods in trade), 1202.07 (columns or sections of publications), 1202.08 (tide of
single creative work), 1202.09 (names of artists and authors), 1202.10 (model or
grade designations), 1202.11 (background designs and shapes), 1202.12 (varietal
and cultivar names).
TMEP, supra note 134, at § 1202.
211. Our critique of trademark use as a deterministic tool does not diminish the relevance
of the nature of the defendant's use in determining liability. For example, the manner of the
defendant's marketing, the duration of the defendant's use, whether the defendant used the
mark accompanied by a house mark, and whether the defendant has included a disclaimer
along with its use of the mark, all inform a court's infringement analysis. See generally Sally
Beauty Co. v. Beautyco, Inc., 304 F.3d 964 (10th Cir. 2002) (manner of marketing);
Entrepreneur Media, Inc. v. Smith, 279 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2002) (web marketing); Nabisco,
Inc. v. Warner-Lambert, Co., 220 F.3d 43 (2d Cir. 2000) (house mark); Conopco, Inc. v. May
Dep't Stores Co., 46 F.3d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (private label and nature of defendant's use);
Merchant & Evans, Inc. v. Roosevelt Bldg. Prods. Co., 963 F.2d 628, 637 (3d Cir. 1992)
(duration and marketing channels). Likewise, the nature of a defendant's use is an important
part of a court's fair use analysis. See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc.,
408 F.3d 596, 609 (9th Cir. 2005) (listing factors relevant to good faith).
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considerations of consumer association and likely confusion. , If this were
to happen, certainty would not be enhanced.21 3
For example, if courts implement a threshold trademark use
requirement, cases may arise in which the defendant asserts that there
should be no liability because its advertising and sales activities did not
amount to trademark use. Plaintiff trademark owners might then argue that
the threshold test is satisfied by defendant's token use, or some other
ancillary concept. Moreover, even absent such doctrinal evolution,
trademark owners might find it relatively easy to raise factual issues
regarding consumer association or confusion as pertinent to assessments of
use.
Recent international experience corroborates these concerns over the
fact-intensive nature of trademark use. For example, the Australian
Trademark Act expressly provides that a trademark is infringed only when a
sign is used "as a mark."2 1 4 But determining when a sign is used as a mark has
proved extremely difficult.2 1 5 In particular, Australian courts have felt
compelled to resort to contextual analysis, including evidence of actual
216
confusion, in order to characterize the defendant's use l. The European
217
Court of Justice appears to be moving in the same direction. In its most
212. Of course, some trademark use proponents might argue that the trademark use
doctrine will be a new creation, shorn of its historical baggage and reconfigured for application
in the infringement context. That would be a turnabout, as trademark use theorists tend to
claim that their proposals are rooted in history. See supra text accompanying note 78. Moreover,
it would call for a leap of faith that new variants on trademark use would somehow succeed in
achieving certainty where numerous other use doctrines have demonstrably failed.
213. Indeed, it may even be eroded as the stated grounds for decision-making become
detached from the real motivations underlying a decision. See infra text accompanying notes
284-86 (discussing transparency).
214. See Trademarks Act 1995, § 20 (Austl).
215. One Australian scholar has observed to us that the "suggestion that such a
requirement provides certainty when dealing with concrete issues is, however, laughable." See
also Bill Ladas, No Trade Mark Use, No Infringement - Christodoulou v. Disney Enters., Inc.,
Freehills Intellectual Property Bulletin, available at http://www.freehills.com.au/publications/
publications-5558.asp ("The issue [of trademark use] is highly fact-specific, and similar
circumstances could lead to a different result depending upon the perception of consumers").
216. SeeKolotex GIo Austi. Pty Ltd. v. Sara Lee Personal Prods. (1993) 26 I.P.R. I (Austl.).
217. It is not clear whether EU law contains a trademark use requirement. Over the last few
years, various national cotrts have referred questions regarding the existence of a trademark
use requirement to the European Court ofJustice, and the Court's answers have been far from
consistent. See Case C-245/02, Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Budejovicky Budvar, [20041 E.C.R. I-
10989 (ECJ 2004) (EU); Case C-206/01, Arsenal Football Club Plc v. Reed, 2002 E.C.R. 1-10273
(ECJ 2002) (EU); Case C-2/00, Holterhoff v. Freiesleben, [2002] E.C.R. 1-4187 (ECJ 2002)
(EU). See also Case C48/05, Adam Opel v. Autec AC, (ECJ 2007) (EU), 2007 WL 187793,
available at http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=en. The Adam Opel Court did
not squarely address the argument that infringement depended on a trademark use. Instead,
the Court held that there is a prima facie case of infringement if the defendant's use "affects or
is liable to affect the functions of [the plaintiff's] trademark," and the Court effectively defined
trademark use in explaining how a plaintiff would make out that case. Id. at 11 22-25.
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recent judgment on trademark use, handed down in early 2007, the Court
seemed to endorse an approach tied closely to the factual question of
confusion (or related antecedents of association). In that case, Adam Opel AG
v. Autec AG,218 the plaintiff car manufacturer sued a toy company that sold
remote-controlled scale models of the plaintiff's car bearing the plaintiff's
mark. The defendant argued that its use on scale model cars was not "use as
a mark" and, thus, was immune from liability under the German trademark
statute. 2 ' 9 The Court did not say definitively whether the defendant's use was
as a matter of law of the type that came within the scope of the trademark
owner's rights. Instead the Court held that potential liability depended on
whether the relevant consumer "perceive[d] the sign identical to the
[plaintiff's] logo appearing on the scale models ... as an indication that
those products come from . . . [plaintiff] or an undertaking economically
linked to it."220 This formulation is, in essence, an analysis of likely confusion
or, more strictly, of antecedent consumer association that might in turn lead
to confusion.
The significance of Adam Opel from an American perspective 22 is that it
reinforces the lessons drawn from the Australian experience: trademark use
is a requirement that ultimately will give way to an analysis of consumer
218. See Case C48/05, Adam Opel v. Autec AG, (ECJ 2007) (EU), 2007 WL 187793, available
at http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=en.
219. Id. at 10; see also First Council Directive 89/104/EEC, art. 5(1)(a), to Approximate
the Laws of the Member States Relating to Trade Marks, 1989 O.J. (L 40) 1 (EC) [hereinafter
EU Trademark Directive].
220. Adam Ope; 2007 WL 187793, at 24.
221. Despite the failure of the trademark use requirement to provide any greater certainty,
there is arguably a stronger prescriptive argument for the trademark use requirement within
the EU for several reasons. First, the EU Trademark Directive creates something close to an
absolute property right for trademark owners vis-a-vis the use of the identical mark on goods
identical to those for which mark is registered. See EU Trademark Directive, supra note 219, art.
5(1)(a). Proving likely confusion is not necessary. See id. And the defenses in Article 6 are, at
least as interpreted by the Court of Justice, insufficient to permit a series of uses that we might
wish to permit. Thus, courts yearn for a limit on the scope of prima facie rights under Article 5,
such as a trademark use requirement might create. Second, the EU Trademark Directive seeks
to ensure that the same level of trademark protection is available from one country to another,
thus facilitating the free movement of goods and services. As the Adam Opel court
acknowledged, this can only be achieved through a uniform interpretation of the types of use
that are actionable under Article 5(1). See Adam Opel; 2007 WL 187793, at 17. Yet, once that
concept of actionable use is defined by reference to the national consumer, the question of
trademark use becomes hostage to factual assessments of consumer association that might vary
from one member state to another (unless the Court is willing to acknowledge that questions of
consumer association and likely confusion might also involve legal policy choices). The
Advocate General, in contrast, was willing to accept that what constituted "trademark use"
should be partially a matter of (national) consumer perception and partly a matter of (EU)
legal policy. See id. at 1 24-25. Finally, if a trademark use requirement grounded in EU-wide
legal policy excluded use on model cars from the scope of a trademark owner's rights, national
unfair competition law might provide a back-up designed to regulate egregious behavior
violating norms other than economic efficiency. U.S. law currently contains no such back-up.
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association or likely confusion. Comparative analysis thus supports our
argument that trademark use is a far more complex and fact-dependent
concept than its advocates admit.222 If U.S. courts followed the same
approach, the principal benefit claimed for the trademark use
requirement-its purported gatekeeper function and, thus, reduced
litigation costs-disappears.
Two recent U.S. cases that expressly invoke a trademark use
requirement illustrate the inability to detach use from questions of
association or confusion. In Interactive Products Corporation v. a2z Mobile Office
223Solutions, Inc., when the defendant used the plaintiffs mark in the post-
domain path of a URL, the court purported to erect a trademark use
requirement. The court declared that if the defendants were using the
trademark only "in a 'non-trademark' way-that is, in a way that does not
identify the source of a product-then trademark infringement and false
designation of origin laws do not apply."22 4 Because the court concluded that
there was no evidence that the defendant had used the mark in that fashion,
it was able to resolve the case without reaching the multi-factor likelihood of
confusion test.22 5 However, the court's very definition of "non-trademark
way" intermingled trademark use and consumer association concepts, and
its analysis of use was in effect an assessment of confusion conducted without
any rigor. The court stated that the issue in the case was whether the
presence of the plaintiffs mark in the defendant's post-domain path "[was]
likely to cause confusion among consumers," or, alternatively, "whether a
consumer [was] likely to notice [the plaintiffs mark] in the post-domain
path" and then think that defendant's product may be produced by the
plaintiff.226 And the court rendered judgment on the purported trademark
use issue by speculating briefly on consumers' online behavior and basing a
generalized conclusion (that "post-domain paths do not typically signify
source") 227 on what appears to be judicial supposition. 228
222. See also Verimark (Pty) Ltd. v. BMW (AG), [2007] SCA 53, 61 (Republic South Africa,
Court of Appeal, May 17, 2007) (noting that what is required to establish trademark use is "an
interpretation of the mark through the eyes of the consumer as used by the alleged infringer";
"if the use creates an impression of a material link between the product and the owner of the
mark there is infringement; otherwise, there is not").
223. Interactive Prods. Corp. v. a2z Mobile Office Solutions, Inc., 326 F.3d 687 (6th Cir.
2003).
224. Id. at 695.
225. See id. at 698
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. The court speculated about whether consumers would typically reach a secondary
webpage by typing in a full URL (i.e., including post-domain paths) and concluded, apparently
on judicial notice, that they would not. See Interactive Prods., 326 F.3d at 697. Consumers would
"more likely" reach a retailer's main page and link to the secondary page. Id. at 697. These
suppositions may, of course, be correct. But that is not the point. The methodology is hardly
emblematic of the values that trademark use theorists tout.
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The Ninth Circuit's Bosley decision229 also illustrates the false
determinacy of trademark use, albeit in a different way. Defendant Kremer
operated a website critical of plaintiff Bosley's hair restoration services at the
domain www.BosleyMedical.com, and Bosley alleged infringement (among
other claims) of its BOSLEY MEDICAL mark.230 The Ninth Circuit affirmed
summary judgment against Bosley on the infringement claim. 23 ' The court
read the phrase "in connection with the sale of goods or services" in the
Lanham Act infringement provision as requiring that the trademark owner
show that the defendant's use was a "commercial" use.232
Perhaps reflecting the ambiguity over the meaning of trademark use,
trademark use theorists have read this supposed "commercial use" element
of the cause of action as a trademark use requirement.233 The plausibility of
this assimilation aside, the court's analysis of this requirement was primarily
a vehicle for a priori conclusions regarding confusion. The court asserted
that "no customer will mistakenly purchase a hair replacement service from
Kremer under the belief that the service is being offered by Bosley" and that
Kremer was not "capitalizing on [Bosley's] good will."2 3 4 The court also
intejected an attenuated speech analysis into the prima facie infringement
case, stating that "the appropriate inquiry is whether Kremer offers competing
services to the public" and concluding that because "Kremer is not Bosley's
competitor; he is their critic," the court should deem the use to be not in
235connection with a sale of goods and services. Bosley provides an important
caution about embracing a trademark use requirement: it is so malleable
that it can readily morph into any form that may suit judges' predispositions
(here, regarding speech). A trademark use requirement is not a vehicle for
enhancing certainty in trademark litigation.
C. IGNOR1NG COMPLEXITIES IN THE CONCEPT OFA MARK
In the previous Subpart, we demonstrated that the concept of use is
unlikely to provide the stability and certainty sought by trademark use
theorists. Here, we show that adopting "use as a mark" as the lodestar of
liability analysis raises further questions that are as much about elucidating
the essential characteristics of a mark as they are about the essential
characteristics of use. The debate over the character of a mark encompasses
both empirical questions about how brands function in contemporary
society and normative dilemmas about which aspects of a mark trademark
law should protect.
229. Bosley Med. Inst. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672 (9th Cir. 2005).
230. Id. at 675.
231. Id. at 682.
232. Id. at 676-77.
233. See Dogan & Lemley, Defenses, supra note 18, at 17 n.52.
234. See Bosley, 403 F.3d at 679-80.
235. Id. at 679. Of course, competitors can also be critics.
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If the trademark use theory were to be adopted, courts would
experience great pressure to delineate more sharply what they mean by the
legal concept of a "mark." The writings of trademark use theorists reflect
how complex this exercise would be and wander into fundamental debates
concerning the nature of trademark law. Under a restrictive reading of use
as a mark, trademark use theory would (perhaps unwittingly) dismantle
bodies of trademark law that have, over the last thirty years, come to be of
vast commercial significance. Under a broader reading, this commercial
value might be left intact, but the theory would not achieve the objectives for
which it has been propounded.
Consider the hidden complexities introduced by one leading
definition. Professor Barrett defines "use a mark" as the "application of a
mark in a manner that invites consumers to associate the mark with goods or
services that the user is offering for sale or distribution and to rely on it for
information about the source, sponsorship, or affiliation of those goods or
services. ' '216 This definition raises a number of interpretive challenges. Must
the consumer actually "rely" on the defendant's use of the mark for
information about the source of the defendant's goods or services? Barrett's
definition puts in play whether a trademark should be defined by reference1 1- 237
to the defendant producer's intention or consumer understanding. What
236. Barrett, supra note 3, at 375; see also id. at 436 (arguing that certain types of activities
"do not constitute trademark use because they do not use the mark as a brand to communicate
the source of the defendant's (or anyone else's) goods or services to consumers"); Dogan &
Lemley, supra note 3, at 805 (defining trademark use as "the use of the mark to brand or
advertise the defendant's services or to suggest an affiliation with the plaintiff"); Widmaier,
supra note 3, at 604-06.
237. Professor Barrett tries to minimize some of these ambiguities by suggesting that "[flor
purposes of infringement liability, determining whether the defendant has made a trademark
use [only] of a plaintiff's mark is an objective inquiry." See Barrett, supra note 3, at 446 n.333. As
a result, the defendant's subjective intention would not be relevant to the determination of
whether its use was a trademark. However, we are unsure what form an "objective" inquiry
regarding trademark use would take. In particular, would a court be permitted to make
reference to the likelihood of confusion or the extent of consumer association with a single
source created by the defendant's use of the term? Both of these questions are fact-intensive,
and expert surveys are often an important part of the proof. If these considerations are part of
the objective inquiry, it is hard to see how the trademark use requirement will serve the
gatekeeper function that its advocates desire. Indeed, an objective determination of trademark
use would likely become something very similar to the analysis of confusion that trademark use
advocates seek to avoid (with perhaps greater focus on "association" than "confusion"). This is
the lesson of the comparative analysis above. See supra text accompanying notes 214-22. In
seeking to develop this idea, Professor Barrett distinguishes between an analysis of the nature of
the use for purposes of infringement liability, which she suggests should be an objective inquiry,
and a court's analysis of fair use, which she argues should be "subjective in nature, excusing
uses that may, objectively, constitute trademark use, but which were intended by the defendant,
in good faith, only to describe the defendant's product or service." Id. However, the Ninth
Circuit, on remand in KP Permanent, picking up on language in the Supreme Court's opinion in
the same case, determined good faith for the purposes of the fair use defense under section
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if the consumer relies on the defendant's use of the mark to indicate his
devotion to the sporting talents of the plaintiff? Do trademark use theorists
mean to reject the modern notion of a mark as encompassing feelings of
affiliation? If the defendant does not "invite[] consumers to associate the
mark with goods or services "238 because, for example, the mark is being used
by the defendant for its aesthetic purposes, is that use as a mark? Where a mark
has a dual meaning as a source-identifier and a form of ornamentation, can
a defendant escape liability by claiming that its use was ornamental even if
the plaintiff's use was as a source-identifier?
International developments again highlight that ignoring the
complexity surrounding the concept of a "mark" may give rise to a number
of unintended consequences. For example, the U.K courts have also sought
guidance from the European Court of Justice on whether use must be "use
as a mark" in order to be infringement under the European Union
Trademark Directive. The issue was raised by Mr. Justice Laddie in Arsenal
Football Club v. Reed, in which a prominent soccer club sued a soccer
merchandise retailer that sold unauthorized souvenirs bearing the
trademarks owned by the soccer club (its name and badge).2 9 Mr. Justice
Laddie concluded that because "the use in question would be perceived as a
badge of support, loyalty or affiliation to the trade mark proprietor" that
would not be use as a mark sufficient to support a finding of trademark
infringement.
240
The European Court of Justice rejected that argument on the ground
that whether the defendant has made a trademark use was not, as such, the
relevant consideration on the question of infringement. Instead, liability
should turn on whether the use complained about was likely to 'jeopardise
the guarantee of origin which constitutes the essential function of the
mark. 24' However, in an almost contemporaneous decision of the House of
Lords in R. v. Johnstone, the U.K's highest court appeared to hold that in
33(b) (4) by reference to a number of objective factors. See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v.
Lasting Impression I, Inc., 408 F.3d 596, 609 (9th Cir. 2005).
238. Barrett, supra, note 3, at 375.
239. SeeArsenal Football Club v. Reed, (2001) 25 R.P.C. 922, 922-23 (Ch.).
240. Id. at 943.
241. Case C-206/01, Arsenal Football Club v. Reed, 2002 E.C.R. 1-10273, at 604. The
European Court ofJustice explained that:
Once it has been found that, in the present case, the use of the sign in question by
the third party is liable to affect the guarantee of origin of the goods and that the
trade mark proprietor must be able to prevent this, it is immaterial that in the
context of that use the sign is perceived as a badge of support for or loyalty or
affiliation to the proprietor of the mark.
Id. at 61. After some resistance from Mr. Justice Laddie, the English Court of Appeal ensured
the effectuation of the European Court's ruling. See Arsenal Football Club v. Reed, [2003]
E.T.M.R. 73 (Court of Appeal 2003) (U.K.); see also supra text accompanying notes 217-20
(discussing subsequent case law of the European Court ofJustice).
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order to be an infringing use, use of a mark must be use as a "badge of
,,242
origin. The import of that decision is unclear, but "there is no doubt that
[the] judgement in Johnstone has left the question of use in some disarray in
the UK"
243
This disarray reflects the intensity of an underlying theoretical dilemma
regarding the essence of trademarks and trademark law. A similar dilemma
exists in the United States. The modern view of trademarks as more than
mere indications of source clearly reflects how consumers actually use marks
in a brand-conscious society, 244 and thus, scholarly and judicial disagreement
centers on the normative question: should trademark law protect signals of
affiliation and endorsement? Should trademark law protect the full panoply
of human reactions and consumer meaning induced by brands?
This normative debate is also reflected in the asymmetry between the
definition of a "mark" and the infringement provisions contained in the U.S.
statute. Section 45 of the Lanham Act still defines trademarks in terms that
stress source-identification: a trademark includes "any word, name, symbol, or
device, or any combination thereof.., used by a person... to identify and
distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from those
manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods,
even if that source is unknown."245 Although the statutory definition of a
trademark has remained constant since the enactment of the Lanham Act,
judicial understanding of the concept of a trademark has substantially
242. SeeR. v. Johnstone, [2004] E.T.M.R. 2 (H.L.) (U.K.).
243. Jennifer Davis, Between a Sign and a Brand: Mapping the Boundaries of a Registered Trade
Mark in European Union Trade Mark Law, in TRADE MARKS AND BRANDS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY
CRITIQUE (Lionel Bently, Jennifer Davis &Jane Ginsburg, eds.) (forthcoming 2007). See generally
Rico Calleja, R. v Johnstone: Bootlegging and Legitimate Use of an Artiste's Trade Mark, 14 ENT. L.
REV. 186 (2003);Jennifer Davis, To Protect or Serve? European Trade Mark Law and the Decline of the
Public Interest, 25 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 180 (2003); P. Dryberg & M. Skylv, Does Trade Mark
Infringement Require That the Infringing Use Be Trade Mark Use and If So, What Is "Trade Mark Use?",
25 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 229 (2005); A. Poulter, What is "Use": Reconciling Divergent Views on the
Nature of Infringing Use, TRADEMARK WORLD, Dec. 2003/Jan. 2004, at 23; R. Sumroy & C. Badger,
Infringing 'Use in the Course of Trade" Trade Mark Use and the Essential Function of a Trade Mark, in
TRADE MARK USE J. Phillips & I. Simon eds., 2005).
244. AsJudge Alex Kozinski has noted:
There's a growing tendency to use trademarks not just to identify products but also
to enhance or adorn them, even to create new commodities altogether. There was
a time when the name of a shirt's manufacturer was discreetly sewn inside the
collar. Izod and Pierre Cardin changed all that, making the manufacturer's logo
an integral part of the product itself. Do you like a particular brand of beer?
Chances are you can buy a T-shirt that telegraphs your brand loyalty. Some people
put stickers on their cars announcing their allegiance to the Grateful Dead. Go
figure.
Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 961 (1993). Indeed, the principal
economic value of marks might lie in their capacity to embody these extended forms of
meaning.
245. Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
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expanded in line with both a broader social role for marks and liberalizing
changes to other parts of the Lanham Act, including the infringement
provisions. For example, although the provision delineating the scope of
liability for infringement of registered marks (section 32 of the Lanham Act)
initially limited liability to uses by the defendant that were "likely to cause
confusion or mistake or to deceive purchasers as to the source of origin of
goods," a 1962 amendment deleted the second half of the clause.24 ' This
appeared to render actionable the confusion of persons other than
purchasers and confusion regarding matters other than the source of
origin.247 Certainly, courts thought so, reflecting in part a broader view of
how trademarks operated in fact. And judicial expansion of protection
beyond strict source-identification since 1962 was later affirmed in the 1988
revisions to the Lanham Act. The 1988 Act amended the infringement
provision relating to unregistered marks explicitly to create liability for uses
"likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or
as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or
commercial activities by another person."
248
This asymmetry between the philosophy informing the establishment of
rights and that informing the definition of infringement might reflect a real
schism between competing notions of the legally protectable aspects of a
mark.24 9 And we suspect that the philosophical disagreement may infect
litigation over the interpretation of use "as a mark." For example, if courts
read a "use as a mark" requirement strictly as incorporating the notion of
the mark as a "source-identifier," 25 they might undermine the multi-billion
dollar industry of brand merchandising and product design. We do not
251believe that trademark theorists intend this outcome. If they did, this
redrawing of the scope of trademark rights should occur through a candid
252debate about the social value of validating Veblen goods and not
collaterally through a back-door interpretation of a newly discovered
doctrine of trademark law. If instead, proponents mean to read "use as a
mark" as incorporating the broader social understanding of "mark" that has
come to inform contemporary trademark law, then the capacity of the
246. Syntex Labs., Inc. v. Norwich Pharm. Co., 437 F.2d 566, 568 (2d Cir. 1971).
247. It is a matter of debate whether Congress intended the extent of expansion that the
1962 amendment has precipitated. See Sara Stadler, The Wages of Ubiquity in Trademark Law, 88
IOWA. L. REv. 731, 800-01 (2003).
248. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (A).
249. SeeJerre B. Swann, Dilution Redefined for the Year 2002, 92 TRADEMARK REP. 585, 596
(2002).
250. This term is often used as the common short-hand term for mark.
251. See generally Dogan & Lemley, supra note 3.
252. Veblen goods are commonly called "status purchases"-goods that consumers find
more desirable because of their exclusivity and relatively high price rather than their intrinsic
qualities. See THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS 85 (1899).
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theory to limit the expansion of trademark law might be open to question. If
a plaintiff need only show that the defendant's use involves uses of a mark
that raise questions of association, it will not be difficult for plaintiffs to state
a plausible case of infringement.
Rather, we believe that trademark use theorists seek to curtail what they
regard as the unwarranted expansion of trademark rights. Yet, to prune
trademark tights back to their core may require a more effective cutting
tool. At the very least, it requires a device that does not possess the ancillary
entanglements with the contested notion of a "trademark."
Nor is merchandizing the only established form of trademark
protection that a virulent trademark use theory might put in jeopardy. We
expect that product design claims could be suspect under a trademark use
theory. Over the last three decades, courts in the United States and
elsewhere have recognized that "almost anything at all that is capable of
carrying meaning" may function as a trademark for consumers and, acting
on that premise, have vastly expanded the types of subject matter that can
receive protection under trademark law. 253 Indeed, there are now effectively
254
no restrictions on trademark subject matter under U.S. law.
Despite this liberal approach to trademark subject matter, protection
for new forms of subject matter, such as product designs, has proven
controversial. Opposition to generous trademark protection for designs
reflects both a skepticism about whether designs typically act to identify the
source of products for consumers and concern that trademark protection
for designs may confer monopoly power over a product market or offerS 255
patent-like protection for innovation not meeting patent standards.
Because courts have largely removed subject-matter limits on protection,
opponents of broad product design protection are thus forced to articulate
their objections as attacks on distinctiveness.2 56
As a result, the focus of product design litigation is often whether the
design is distinctive-that is, whether it is acting as a mark. Although that
question is most typically raised in the context of establishing trademark
rights, the trademark use theory threatens to transfer the courts' skeptical
approach on that question to the infringement context, even where it can be
253. See Qualitex Co. v.Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995).
254. See Dinwoodie, Social Norms, supra note 29, at 6.
255. See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001); Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 215 (2000).
256. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Wal-Mart v. Samara on the inherent
distinctiveness of product design trade dress represents a leading example of a court collapsing
a number of legitimate trademark policy concerns into a single (distinctiveness) doctrine. In
some respects, this is not surprising, given the history of distinctiveness doctrine. See Dinwoodie,
supra note 79, at 238 (noting that distinctiveness analysis typically incorporates competitiveness
considerations as well as empirical questions of consumer association). But a failure to treat the
different policy concerns separately does prevent a proper identification of the competing
interests at stake. See Dinwoodie, Social Norms, supra note 29, at 31.
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established that the plaintiffs design does act as a source-identifier. Under
the trademark use theory, if the defendant is not using the design as a mark,
no liability will arise. Yet, because a product design will almost always serve
purposes in addition to source-identification, that argument will almost
always be available to defendants that simulate the plaintiffs design. While
skeptical judicial attitudes to the possibility of designs acting as source-
identifiers may be assuaged by a plaintiff demonstrating substantial efforts
over time to create such meaning for consumers, a defendant is unlikely
(especially when first putting the product on the market) to have behaved in
ways that show the design to be acting as its mark, rather than for some
other purpose. But the harm to the distinctiveness of the plaintiffs mark
and the confusion caused among consumers will be precisely the same,
regardless of whether the public immediately understands the design to be a
source-identifier for the defendant.
57
Again, comparative analysis suggests that this scenario is not speculative.
A Singapore court recently relied on trademark use theory to limit
protection for a mark consisting of the shape of pipe fittings, which was
258
alleged to be distinctive and, thus, serving as a trademark. The court held
that, regardless of whether the plaintiffs design was acting as a trademark,
because there was "no evidence ... that the defendant ... had in fact used
the pipe fittings ... as a trademark as such," the infringement claim would
be dismissed. 259 Given the ongoing debate in the United States about the
appropriateness of protecting product design trade dress, fomented in part
by recent Supreme Court decisions that express skepticism about the
protection of product design and seek to curtail the scope of such
260protection, we would expect the trademark use theory to be deployed
against product design claims. 26' Yet, if effective, the theory would once
again drastically redraw established trademark law without considering any
of the important questions that are raised by product design trademarks,
such as competitive effects and interference with patent protection. Instead,
257. Of course, if the public actually makes a confused association between the products of
the plaintiff and defendant, then one might argue that the defendant is making a trademark
use. But as we discussed above in the context of Adam Opel, such an argument is inconsistent
with the notion of clear threshold requirements that trademark use theorists desire.
258. Nation Fittings (M) Sdn Bhd v. Oystertec Plc, SGHC 225 (Singapore H.Ct. 2005),
available at http://www.asianlii.org/sg/cases/SGHC/2005/225.html.
259. Id.
260. See Dinwoodie, Rehnquist, supra note 29, at 193-95.
261. Indeed, the Sixth Circuit decision in Gentile provides some support for our suspicion.
See generally Rock & Roll Hall of Fame & Music, Inc. v. Gentile Prods., 134 F.3d 749 (6th Cir.
1998). There, the Sixth Circuit reversed an infringement finding where a photographer had
included the silhouette design of the distinctive Rock & Roll Hall of Fame in a photograph
taken of the Cleveland skyline. Id. at 751. The court endorsed what might be seen as an early
version of the trademark use theory. See id. at 753. However, the case could have been decided
more properly on other grounds, and the decision no doubt reflected a concern about the
overlap between copyright and trademark law.
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the revision of the law would be achieved through the mere assertion that
defendants frequently use designs otherwise than as marks, even in the face
of evidence that a design acts as a source-identifier for the plaintiff
producer.
D. THIE FALSE ALLURE OFA WONDER THEORY
Trademark use has been promoted as the wonder drug for trademark
law, a limiting theory of immense attraction in an otherwise expansionist
262
climate. Thus, as we have seen, proponents claim that trademark use
is indispensable for protecting consumer interests, 263  preserving
competition, 264 encouraging information intermediaries to invest in online
265 266
commerce, and preserving speech interests. Some go so far as to
connect trademark use with prospects for developing new information
technologies.
26 7
It is hard to take issue with any of these policy goals. 268 However,
legitimate debates over the role of trademark law in regulating contextual
advertising, parody, merchandising, and product design simulation, to
mention but a few examples, implicate a number of different values and
262. See, e.g., Barrett, supra note 3, at 373; Dogan & Lemley, supra note 3, at 836-37 ("The
doctrine of trademark rise... holds sway against changing notions of consumer confusion; it is
designed to be a bulwark against unreasonable expansion of trademark law.").
263. See Barrett, supra note 3, at 456 (concluding that "the trademark use requirement
serves as an essential means of protecting consumers' interests in the digital context"); Michael
H. Davis, Death of a Salesman's Doctrine: A Critical Look at Trademark Use, 19 GA. L. REV 233, 234
(1985) ("Because trademark use is a form of consumer protection, each time the doctrine is
eroded, the consuming public is injured.").
264. See Davis, supra note 263, at 242 (arguing that trademark use is important because it
imposes a burden on the trademark claimant, thus providing "some assurance that the
anticompetitive and monopolistic grant of trademark rights is justified"); Dogan & Lemley,
supra note 3, at 798 (arguing that trademark use doctrines reduce consumer search costs, thus
facilitating the flow of information in the marketplace and thereby helping to ensure that the
marketplace is robustly competitive).
265. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 3, at 782.
266. See id. at 798 (asserting that trademark use doctrines "help to ensure that the
trademark grant does not stifle informative speech by noncompetitors"). For recent analyses of
the trademark/speech intersection, see generally Michael K. Cantwell, Confusion, Dilution and
Speech: First Amendment Limitations on the Trademark Estate: An Update, 94 TRADEMARK REP. 547
(2004); Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Policing the Border Between Trademarks and Free Speech: Protecting
Unauthorized Trademark Use in Expressive Works, 80 WASH. L. REV. 887 (2005).
267. See Barrett, supra note 3, at 456-57 (warning that recognizing trademark liability
without a trademark use requirement "will stifle the development of new information
technologies, with no offsetting advantage").
268. Other scholars concerned with the expansion of trademark rights have placed blame
on other parts of trademark law (e.g., the actionability of initial interest confusion). See, e.g.,
Rothman, supra note 175, at 111-13 (listing ills that will flow from an unchecked doctrine of
initial interest confusion). The excesses of particular trademark decisions are likely the result of
a number of trademark doctrines, and they will best be checked by attending to that variety of
doctrines rather than seeking a single panacea.
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considerations far too extensive to be captured adequately by the single
concept of trademark use. 26 9 Trademark use is simply too blunt a concept,
no matter how defined, to capture the full range of values at play in these
debates.
Contextualism is a better alternative than the formalism of trademark
use and has always been important in trademark law. Context is the means
by which courts have traditionally constrained the scope of trademark law
and trademark rights. Apple Vacations, Inc., which owns the mark APPLE
for holiday travel services, cannot enjoin the use of APPLE for computers if,
despite the use of identical words, the context of the respective product
markets ensures a lack of confusion. Likewise, although private label goods
might be adorned with similar labels and used on identical goods, the
context of the form of their marketing and distribution may persuade courts
that consumers can adequately differentiate between branded and private
270label options. Comparative advertising efficiently aids consumers to obtain
similar products at cheaper prices, but if that comparative advertising takes
the form of language that deceives consumers about a false similarity,
context tells us that the savings are illusory and the defendant's use is an
• t- •27!
infringement. Ordinarily, a defendant has a right to use its own name in
272its business, but if the defendant has sold the name for valuable
consideration to a third party, that context demands that we take a different
view. 213 When a defendant would be at a competitive disadvantage if unable
to simulate a distinctive design, we treat the design as functional and free to
be copied.274 However, if context suggests that the advantage is reputation-
related, trademark law takes a different view.
In all these cases, the formalistic labeling of the defendant's use is a
poor guide to the appropriate outcome under trademark law. Context
matters. Analysis of confusion is inherently contextual, while trademark use,
if it is to achieve the goals set for it by its proponents, is a formalistic
monolith. A contextual analysis, of course, is somewhat messier, as context
requires parties to develop a greater range of facts. But that is what allows
trademark law to adapt and deal comprehensively with the range of
commercial settings to which it applies in the modern economy. And, as we
demonstrated above, the formalist character of the use doctrine has
historically caused courts to modify and stretch it, thus robbing the doctrine
269. Similar problems arguably attend over-reliance on the distinction between idea and
expression to ensure an appropriate scope of copyright protection. See generally Samuelson,
supra note 114.
270. See Conopco, Inc. v. May Dep't Stores, 46 F.3d 1556, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
271. See Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 565-66 (9th Cir. 1968).
272. See L.E. Waterman v. Modem Pen. Co., 235 U.S. 88, 98 (1914).
273. See Levitt Corp. v. Levitt, 593 F.2d 463, 468-69 (2d Cir. 1979).
274. SeeDinwoodie, supra note 35, at 704-06.
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of the benefits that proponents seek and tending to result in courts adopting
the type of messy, contextual analysis we prefer.
Thus, one might ask, what's the difference, if the result is the same?
Contextualism is to be preferred because it allows for transparent
development of trademark law. Trademarks serve a number of roles other
than providing consumers with informational short-cuts, such as augmenting
the social vocabulary, facilitating economic expansion, and assuring the
public of the authenticity of artistic products.f 5 And those roles might
implicate policy concerns that vary widely in weight and significance. While
trademark law does not always deal as crisply with those competing values as
it might, it is only by discussion of the context that those values can be
brought to the surface and properly weighed against the core value of
avoiding consumer confusion.
Moreover, the need for attention to context has only grown as
trademarks have come to assume an even greater multitude of roles in
contemporary society: trademarks are increasingly important to self-276 277278
identity,276 to political speech, 27 7 to efficient organization of information,
to product comparison, 279 to entertainment,280 and to business models
facilitating free copyright content online.2 8 ' The multivalence of trademark
law is not well-accommodated by the supposedly binary switch of trademark
use/non-trademark use. Trademarks do far too much for such a line to be of
much help. Our approach allows trademark litigants to advance different
policy objectives. A review of recent trademark cases shows that disputes
frequently involve a number of competing values and may require balancing
of the gains of consumer avoidance with the competing social gains of free
2812
speech or some other public good.
To mention but one example, in the recent legislative reform of
dilution law, trademark use was proposed (and arguably adopted by
Congress) as a way of limiting the more powerful dilution remedy and, thus,
275. See generally Kozinski, supra note 244 (discussing a number of uses of trademarks).
276. See generally S. F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U. S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987).
277. See Mastercard Int'l, Inc. v. Nader 2000 Primary Comm., Inc., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1046, 1048-51 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
278. See Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 702-04 (E.D. Va.
2004).
279. See Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 566 (9th Cir. 1968).
280. See Lorne Manly, When the Ad Turns into the Story Line, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2005, § 3, at 1.
281. See Nuttall, supra note 180.
282. Of course, multifactor tests, such as likelihood of confision in trademark law, can
acquire their own formalism over time. See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multiftictor
Tests for Trademark Infringement, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1581, 1590-92 (2006). However, courts have not
been shy about adapting the standard tests where the special circumstances of a case render the
multifactor test unhelpful. See Dinwoodie &Janis, supra note 38, at 1709 n.32.
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effectuating First Amendment values.2 83 However, we would rather effectuate
those values by explicitly incorporating other thresholds linked to the
purpose of dilution (e.g., protecting unique marks), substantive constraints
on the meaning of the dilution (assuming we secure a better conceptual
grasp of the harm caused by dilution), or defenses that transparently and
explicitly require courts to take into account the policy values (e.g., the
benefit of free speech, news reporting) that are potentially at issue when
dilution claims are asserted.
Current trademark adjudication is insufficiently transparent. One of the
primary causes of that problem is that courts often dress up legitimate policy
objectives, such as the pursuit of certainty or ensuring fair competition, in
formalistic language that immunizes the conclusion (and hence the
underlying policy objective) from scrutiny and testing. Indeed, the language
of consumer association and consumer confusion, which we insist must
retain its primacy in trademark law, is the most common vehicle for such
unhelpful habits. 28 4 But trademark use is another such vehicle and one that
is clearly gaining in popularity. The policy basis for the application of the
trademark use theory often rests upon a priori assumptions about consumer
2815
understanding. Scholars assert, in the face of ambiguous empirical
evidence, that non-trademark use cannot give rise to confusion. This error is
redolent of an unfortunate tendency to create new doctrines on the basis of
untested empirical assertions about consumer behavior more generally.
286
This tendency, rather than obviating the need for analysis of confusion,
simply dresses up an a priori conclusion about confusion with a label that
evinces objective pretensions. It reveals the trademark use theory to be a
vehicle for apparent reactive lawmaking without forcing courts either to
make the factual determinations central to a reactive approach or to defend
the policy basis for an alternative proactive prescription.
283. See Dilution Hearing, supra note 8. The final version of the bill pursued this goal rather
inartfully, raising some doubt about whether the trademark use requirement was indeed
introduced as an element of the dilution cause of action. See generally Dinwoodie & Janis, supra
note 9.
284. See Dinwoodie, Social Norms, supra note 29, at 12.
285. See Barrett, supra note 3, at 430; see also Rothman, supra note 175, at 108. Dogan and
Lemley do also ground their version of the theory in the pragmatic capacity of search engines
to monitor uses and the undeniable assertion that trademark rights do not protect against all
uses of the mark. However, their justification for allowing contextual advertising under the
rubric of trademark use also contains a priori conclusions about the invariable effect of
contextual advertising on consumers' search costs. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 3, at 812
(dismissing as "rather silly" a theory of confusion based upon "whether the advertiser is likely to
confuse consumers by placing its ad next to the search results generated by the trademark as
search term"); cf id. at 784 ("Search technologies, as well as consumer practices and
expectations, are constantly evolving in a way that makes it impossible to assess the existence
and the costs of consumer confusion.").
286. This tendency is typified by the jurisprudence of Justice Scalia. See Dinwoodie,
Rehnquist, supra note 29, at 196-97, 203 (discussing Wal-Mart and Dastar).
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Consider two examples. Courts frequently justify parodies of trademarks
on the ground that consumers would not be confused by the defendant's
2871parodic use. In such cases, courts often refer to free speech concerns that
might counsel in favor of the defendant's speech not being enjoined, but
the conclusion of a court rarely depends upon free speech values trumping
concerns about confusion. Yet some parodies are less likely to confuse
consumers, suggesting a lesser need to be concerned about the affirmative
goals of trademark law. And some parodies might be less justified by our
principles of free speech than others, thus warranting lesser solicitude to
effectuate those values. But those calculations cannot be made simply by
calling the activity parody (say, as opposed to satire), and the relevant policy
considerations that guide courts cannot fully be assessed by characterizing
the entire use by defendant as protected speech. Does satire deserve less
protection than parody, for example, as is the case in copyright law? We
think it is hard to set a definitive rule. Yet, certainty-the goal claimed for
trademark use theory-will in fact be enhanced by identifying the aspects of
a defendant's parody or satire that prompted a court to find infringement or
otherwise.
Likewise, to return to the topic of contextual advertising that drives
much of this debate, as discussed above, we are persuaded that there may be
good reasons to treat differently the different techniques by which
producers bring their webpage to the attention of web users. Meta-tagging
arguably has social effects that are different from those caused by sponsored
links, which are different, in turn, from those generated by pop-up ads,
which are different again (perhaps) from those that will be induced by the
further development of what might be the next phenomenon in online
searching, namely, social bookmarking. s9 Our intuitions on this point are
informed by senses of commercial ethics, as well as privacy values and, of
course, the likely effects on consumer confusion. But, if trademark use is the
theory that structures trademark law, none of those values will form part of
the discussion of trademark liability when a court is confronted with whether
the next form of online promotion gives rise to liability under the Lanham
Act.
287. See, e.g., Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1488 (10th Cir.
1987); see also Gary Myers, Trademark Parody: Lessons from the Copyright Decision in Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 59 LAW. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1996, at 181.
288. See supra note 166.
289. See Mark Daoust, Social Bookmarkingfor Traffic, SITE PRO NEWS, Mar. 22, 2006, http://
www.sitepronews.com/archives/2006/mar/22.html (describing Yahoo's ceding of search
engine market to Google but looking for new market built around social bookmarking); see also
del.icio.us social bookmarking, http://del.icio.us/ (last visited July 4, 2007) (offering social
bookmarking services).
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IV. REFLECTIONS ON CONTEXTUALISM IN TRADEMARK LAW
For all the reasons articulated in Part III, we reject the trademark use
theory. It is at once too amenable to degeneration in order to provide
adequate certainty and too blunt to cope with the exigencies presented by
the range of trademark disputes that are litigated under the Lanham Act.
We prefer a contextual approach that would operate on two essential
principles. First, indiscriminate immunity based on a formal notion of
trademark use should not undermine confusion as the lodestar of trademark
liability. Confusion should remain a central factor in assessing the context in
which consumers experience marks.29°
Second, courts should continue developing defenses and limitations on
trademark rights by articulating and weighing competing rationales (e.g.,
free speech, the value of comparative advertising, the need to avoid
anticompetitive effects) that should prevail notwithstanding some levels of
confusion. 29' And the Supreme Court's explicit endorsement of that
proposition in KP Permanent should, we hope, embolden courts to continue
in that task. This component of our approach is important. Traditionally,
courts in trademark cases seem to have found it easiest to engage the law
proactively through developing defenses and limiting doctrines.2
92
Confusion assessments may have a larger reactive element, and sole reliance
on confusion as the tool for calibrating rights would put at risk the law's
ability to evolve progressively. 293 Accordingly, when we speak of a contextual
approach, it is one that contemplates autonomous defenses, not one in
which every inquiry is subsumed under confusion analysis.
The debate over trademark use-and our proposal for an alternative,
contextualist approach-has the greatest immediate significance in the
context of online contextual advertising, particularly in pending litigation
294involving Google in a number of countries (including the United States).
Under a trademark use theory, search engines, such as Google, that use
others' trademarks in the sale of targeted advertising would receive
immunity from trademark infringement merely by characterizing their uses
290. Indeed, the court in GEICO v. Google, Inc. adopted precisely that approach, holding
the search engine potentially liable but ultimately granting judgment for the defendants
because of a lack of likely confusion. See Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp.
2d 700, 704 (E.D. Va. 2004).
291. That balancing of objectives might be performed either in determining actionable
levels and types of confusion or in developing defenses. Courts engaged in confusion analysis
have always implicitly made such calculations, although too often without acknowledging that
choices are being made. One finds more frequent reference to competing concerns in
decisions of courts applying and developing defenses to trademark claims, but even there,
courts too often wrap up their conclusion in the more comfortable language of confusion. See
Dinwoodie, Social Norms, supra note 29, at 15.
292. See generally id. (exploring proactive engagement).
293. See id. at 6-9.
294. See supra notes 10-12.
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of marks as something other than use as a mark. By foreclosing trademark
law from playing any role in the regulation of contextual advertising results
generated by search engines, regardless of effects on consumers, the
trademark use theory evinces a confidence in unrestrained market behavior
295that we find troubling. Under our approach, courts would typically analyze
both the manner in which search engines sold advertising and the manner
in which they presented search results to consumers. In the usual case,
courts would be free to balance the extent of any likely confusion against
countervailing values and, in light of that balance, would consider whether
to apply one of any number of defenses.
It should be clear that our approach would not lead invariably to
trademark infringement liability for all sales of keywords tied to trademarks.
Our approach recognizes and accommodates not only the social costs of
confusion but also the potential gains of third-party use of marks (even if
there are some countervailing confusion costs) and the importance of
affording some latitude to new innovators in the early stages of product
development.2 9 6 Because of its inherent flexibility, a contextual approach is
well-suited to account for both the information benefits and the information
211
costs of search engines.
Some may perceive our approach as expressing a preference for
standards over rules. While we think the dichotomy is a bit too stark as
applied here, our contextual approach should provide some of the benefits
typically associated with standards. In particular, it should preserve the
possibility of legal evolution as consumer attitudes, advertising techniques,
and relevant technologies evolve. At the same time, it is surely true that our
approach is subject to one drawback that is characteristic of standards-based
approaches: it achieves flexibility at the cost of trading away some certainty,
and it therefore has the potential to chill some valuable social and
commercial activity.298 In the context of the search engine industry, where
forms of consumer searching, search technologies, and resultant consumer
295. See supra Part III for detailed prescriptive arguments.
296. See Dinwoodie, Social Norms, supra note 29, at 24 (arguing for trademark law to take
this into account).
297. We are not suggesting that confusion analysis be used as a pretext for compelling
search engines to tailor search results optimally for each individual search. That is not our
approach but is rather a reductio ad absurdum of it. Traditional confusion analysis does not
countenance such micro-regulation, whether applied to offline or online consumer
transactions. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Wat Linguistics Can Do For Trademark Law, in TRADE
MARKS AND BRANDS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY CRITIQUE (Lionel Bently, Jennifer Davis & Jane
Ginsburg, eds.) (forthcoming 2007).
298. Of course, as we demonstrated above, we may be trading away very little certainty,
given the doctrinal ambiguities surrounding use as a mark.
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understandings are evolving rapidly, the need for certainty may be
particularly acute.299
But throwing out standards altogether in favor of rule-bound law-the
modus operandi of trademark use theory-is too crude a response. A more
refined solution would preserve the flexibility of the standards-based
approach while developing mechanisms to hedge against its uncertainties in
particularly sensitive cases. This suggestion is by no means unprecedented.
For example, in copyright law, Congress recognized that Internet service
providers should not bear the cost of individual monitoring of user activity
involving unauthorized copyrighted works, and so provided them with
conditional immunity from infringement liability through a safe harbor
provision, section 512 of the Copyright Act.3°° Likewise in trademark law, it
may make sense to interpose a limited safe harbor for some actors, in some
contexts, in order to mediate between uncertain standards and inflexible
rules. In the particular case of search engines, it may be appropriate for
Congress to establish a safe harbor that immunizes responsible
intermediaries who present information in a nonconfusing and transparent
fashion from incurring trademark liability.
Section 512 has many detractors, some of whom appropriately lament
the provision's formidable detail and the intensely contested political battle
from which it emerged.3 0 1 But we regard it as a plausible conceptual model
on which one could construct a limited safe harbor in trademark law. Molly
Van Houweling's recent research, while acknowledging that the copyright
safe harbor has not succeeded in optimizing social gains, provides some
design criteria that may lead to the formulation of more effective safe
harbors.0 2
Van Houweling recommends that safe harbors be designed to minimize
the risk that positive externalities will be lost as a result of overcompliance.3 °3
Overcompliance can occur when actors who would have tested the limits of
permissible behavior in the absence of the safe harbor are enticed by the
safe harbor's promise of immunity. When limit-testers constrain their
behavior in pursuit of immunity, there may be a consequent loss of socially
beneficial activity.30 4 Applied to trademark law, this social loss could take the
299. Standards-based approaches are thought to develop certainty over time through the
accretion of case law, but this process may not unfold neatly in a rapidly changing environment.
See generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992).
300. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Private Ordering and the Creation of International Copyright
Norms: The Role of Public Structuring, 160J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 161, 170-74 (2004).
301. See id.
302. See Molly Van Houweling, Safe Harbors in Copyright Law (July 31, 2006) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the authors).
303. See id. at 13-17.
304. See id. at 11-13. This assumes that the safe harbor is set to provide reassurance for
conduct that falls somewhere between what a risk-averse actor might do absent immunity and
what a limit-testing actor might do. The effect of establishing this level of immunity is that it can
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form of higher search costs, as search engines and other intermediaries are
chilled from innovating and fail to realize their full potential to organize
information efficiently for consumers.
Van Houweling's solution for copyright safe harbors is to design safe
harbors more generously but to extract collateral concessions from
305beneficiaries that further the policies of the relevant legal regime. We
think that the solution is likely to translate well to trademark law, in the
context of a trademark infringement safe harbor for search engines. That is,
instead of establishing the safe harbor to immunize behavior that falls
somewhere between the behavior of a limit-tester (like, say, Google) and
that of a more risk-averse search engine (like, say, Yahoo!), °6 we would offer
a safe harbor of broader scope but impose various conditions on search
engines as a prerequisite to invoking immunity.307 For example, search
engines might be required to present disclaimers on search results pages,',
to disclose information about search methodology,0 9 to differentiate clearly
often be interpreted as establishing a limit on permissible behavior, causing a loss of potentially
positive uses.
305. See id. at I ("An alternative type of safe harbor would condition rule-like treatment not
on especially conservative use of copyright works, but instead on other, affirmative steps that
contribute to the copyright system as a whole."). For example, a party that facilitates the
distribution of unauthorized copyrighted works might be immunized from copyright
infringement liability under certain circumstances in accord with a limited safe harbor
provision but might be required to ensure that the unauthorized copies bear proper attribution
to the author of the copyrighted work. Id. at 14. Attribution, while not a core concern of
copyright policy, would nonetheless be likely to contribute to the furtherance of the
overarching goals of the copyright system.
306. Yahoo! recently changed its policy to stop the sale of advertising keyed to trademarks.
See Kevin Newcomb, Yahoo! Modifies Trademark Keyword Policy, CLICKZ NEWS, Feb 24, 2006,
http://www.clickz.com/showPage.html?page=3587316.
307. We recognize that some of these conditions may extract from search engines
affirmative contributions to optimize search costs that exceed the bounds of typical trademark
policy. But this is appropriate, given the more generous immunity that is being offered as a
quid pro quo. See Van Houweling, supra note 302, at 13.
308. Google has demonstrated a willingness to make prominent declarations regarding
sponsorship and connection on its webpage as part of the Google Book Project. See Pasquale,
Externalities, supra note 147, at 19 n.54 (quoting Google's webpage explanation: "'These links
aren't paid for by those sites, nor does Google or any library benefit if you buy something from
one of these retailers.'"); Pasquale, Rankings, supra note 147, at 121-22 (discussing how Google
dealt with search results that it perceived as anti-semitic).
309. See Introna & Nissenbaum, supra note 182, at 32 (advocating disclosure of algorithms).
Search engines are beginning to do so. See Pasquale, Rankings, supra note 147, at 118 (noting
Google's practices). Of course, a very generalized disclosure about methodology is unlikely to
be carefully read by web users and unlikely to enlighten. Like the early forms of disclosures on
securities prospectuses, they might initially generate some enhanced legitimacy for the search
engines, but they will not alter users' conduct unless they are seen as something more than
boilerplate. This might suggest that the level of detail supplied in order to be effective would be
so detailed that it could come to resemble a regulation issued by a governmental agency such as
the Food and Drug Administration or the Federal Trade Commission. This raises a question for
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between organic and sponsored search results, or when put on notice of
allegedly infringing activity, to de-index the infringing webpage. 3 ' ° The goal
is to develop conditions that oblige search engines to present information
accurately and transparently, without imposing costs so high as to thwart
innovation or implicate other social objectives such as privacy. 31!
If such a safe harbor for search engines or other types of intermediaries
were established, it might serve as a useful rule-based adjunct to an
otherwise standards-driven, contextual analysis for trademark liability. But
we would not expect all search engines to structure their business models so
as to bring themselves within the safe harbor. Nor would we particularly
encourage it. Intermediaries that wished to pursue a business model based
on less information to consumers about their methodology could either
operate without any use of trademarks (in the mold of risk-averse actors) or
test the limits of traditional doctrine by litigating questions of confusion.
Consumers could choose among competing search engines. The market
would determine the relative success of different models.
Over time, we would expect our approach to further the efficiency of
search engines as search costs reducers by ensuring proper differentiation of
paid and unpaid results. And the possibility of litigation under traditional
trademark principles would preserve the public good aspect of trademark
litigation as a generator of norms that provide incremental certainty for
market actors. But the mix of options might also educate web users about
the search capacities and biases of different search results and search
engines. Such a result would counter the potentially path-dependent nature
of confusion-based claims that embed notions of uninformed consumers as
us: would the terms of disclosure best be effectuated through regulations of the Trademark
Office, which are easier to revise, than through the entire legislative apparatus of Congress?
310. Cf 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000) (setting out a series of "notice and takedown" procedures
for online materials that allegedly infringe copyright).
311. We recognize that the project of articulating appropriate conditions is an ambitious
one that runs squarely into our concerns about crafting rules prematurely in a volatile socio-
technological environment. See supra text accompanying note 28. We also recognize that some
of the conditions that we have described as potentially triggering safe harbor immunity are
conditions that typify a lack of likely confusion. Some might object that a safe harbor has little
significance if it only restates the conditions of non-liability. Why would an infringement
defendant ever invoke the safe harbor (or comply with its conditions) if the defendant could
merely assert non-infringement? The answer, ironically, lies in the certainty and cost concerns
that drive the trademark use theory. To achieve immunity through litigation is costly, and the
adequacy of the confusion-dispelling measures will be determined ex post. The safe harbor
confers immunity ex ante and without the cost of litigation. Thus, we might go so far as to say
that there is value to a safe harbor even if the safe harbor conditions do no more than map the
conditions of non-liability under the general standard. But we take seriously the point that
crafting the scope of any safe harbor will require considerable thought. In particular, we would
stress an important design feature identified by Van Houweling, namely, the grant of more
generous immunity to the beneficiary in return for collateral concessions that firther the
broader goals of unfair competition law.
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the norm in assessing the appropriate degree of paternalism for trademark
312law in this area.
The conditions that we impose would seek to increase the transparency
of the search process, ensuring that consumers will become better informed,
making the search results more reliable, and reducing search costs. This is
consistent with the core purposes of trademark law. It might also enhance
••  313
broader values of commercial ethics that inform unfair competition law. 1
CONCLUSION
The trademark use theory is flawed. It lacks a firm foundation in
existing law, and it 'would be counterproductive if adopted as a meta-
principle for future trademark law and policy. Trademark use theory cannot
be justified on a search costs rationale, and it will not provide the certainty
its proponents promise. By ignoring the multivalence of trademark law, the
theory threatens to undermine transparent trademark decisionmaking.
Instead, trademark law should retain its traditional preference for
contextualism and should place assessments of confusion over supposedly
deterministic characterizations of use. Individualized assessments of marks
in their commercial milieu will permit trademark law to better police new
information markets, perhaps in tandem with statutory safe harbors for new-
technology intermediaries such as search engines.
312. See Dinwoodie, Social Norms, supra note 29, at 30. Educating consumers about the
meaning of search results has not been hugely successful to date. See PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN
LIFE PROJECT, supra note 173 (discussing the Pew study).
313. SeeHanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 415-16 (1916).
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